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Abstract 
The United States has long held the idea that Iran poses a threat to our interests as well as global 
stability, implying that Iran is irrational and makes decisions rooted purely in ideology. After 
creating an independent framework based on rational choice theory, descriptive decision theory, 
and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I determined four possible ways to describe 
Iran’s foreign policy: rational-constitutional, irrational-constitutional, rational-unconstitutional, 
and irrational-unconstitutional. I then apply this framework to six cases which I have identified to 
be vital to understanding Iran’s foreign policy: Iraq, Israel, United States of America, China, the 
nuclear program, and proxy groups, and in doing so, I attempt to answer the question of to what 
extent does Iranian Foreign Policy reflect the goals outlined by the Iranian constitution ratified 
in 1979 (with its subsequent amendments); and how does a constitutional reading of foreign 
policy illuminate our understanding of the drivers of Iranian Foreign Policy? The following 
sub-questions will also be considered: Is an ideological foreign policy exclusive from a practical 
foreign policy? If Iran does not act within the goals of the Constitution, why not? In considering 
these cases, I found that Iran’s foreign policy is quite nuanced depending on the case at hand, with 
three cases being determined as rational-constitutional, two as irrational-constitutional, one as 
rational-unconstitutional, and zero as irrational-unconstitutional.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Section 1.1: Introduction and Research Question 
 Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, an understanding of the strategic intent of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has been essential for both regional actors and global powers. From the standpoint 
of the United States, Iran’s regional ambitions are frequently cited as one of the most critical 
foreign policy and security challenges facing the Western world in the twenty-first century. Former 
President George W. Bush declared in his 2002 State of the Union Address, “States like these, and 
their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”1 The 
American concept of the “axis of evil” implies not only that members of that axis serve the same 
purpose and strive for the same goals as terrorist organizations, but more importantly that states 
which pursue goals outside of American interests can be compared to terrorist organizations in the 
first place. 
 Although the term “axis of evil” was coined by the Bush Administration, the Obama 
Administration harbored similar sentiments regarding Iran. While the Obama Administration is 
responsible for implementing diplomatic efforts with Iran which led to the Iran Nuclear Deal, a 
statement given by President Obama in 2016 gives insight into how the United States continued to 
view Iran despite these collaborative efforts: “Of course, even as we implement the nuclear deal 
and welcome our Americans home, we recognize that there remain profound differences between 
the United States and Iran. We remain steadfast in opposing Iran’s destabilizing behavior 
elsewhere…”2 In a separate speech given by President Obama at American University, Obama 
 
1  National Archives and Records Administration. https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 
 
2 “Statement by the President on Iran.” National Archives and Records Administration. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/17/statement-president-iran. 
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was quoted as saying, “Let’s not mince words: The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy 
and some form of war – maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon.”3  
Thus, the Obama Administration may not have been as aggressive in their characterization of Iran, 
but they perpetuated the ideas that interactions with Iran have a high potential to result in violence 
and that peaceful diplomatic relations with Iran are thanks to American, not Iranian, efforts.  
Nearly two decades after Bush’s “axis of evil” declaration, these attitudes continue to be 
reflected by means of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s yearly threat report, 
which assessed in 2019 that “Iran’s regional ambitions almost certainly will threaten US interests 
in the coming year.”4 This assessment is a culmination of nearly two decades of perpetuating of 
the idea that Iran is an aggressive foreign power with an irrational, ideological foreign policy that 
threatens the security of nations across the globe. However, this line of thinking drastically 
undermines the fact that what lies in Iran’s best interest as a sovereign nation does not have to 
coincide with what the United States’ best interest is. Iran is one of the most critical challenges to 
the United States but is simultaneously one of the most misunderstood challenges the United States 
faces. In order to determine an effective policy towards Iran, the United States must step back and 
look at the broader picture, rather than allowing counter-productive attitudes and beliefs that Iran’s 
foreign policy is aggressive and radical in every aspect to hold a monopoly over our policy 
decisions. Thus, the purpose of this thesis will be to analyze Iran’s foreign policy from a more 
holistic perspective, focusing less on how their foreign policy affects the interests of the United 
States.  
 
3 Staff, Washington Post. 2015. “Full Text: Obama Gives a Speech about the Iran Nuclear Deal.” The Washington 
Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/08/05/text-obama-gives-a-speech-about-the-
iran-nuclear-deal/. 
 
4 Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2019. “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community.” https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. 
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In order to assess the rationality and ideology of Iran’s foreign policy, I will turn to a 
document which marks the legal shift in Iran’s foreign policy ambitions: the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s Constitution. In my examination of Iran’s foreign policy in the context of this document, I 
will attempt to answer the following questions: to what extent does Iranian Foreign Policy reflect 
the goals outlined by the Iranian constitution ratified in 1979 (with its subsequent amendments); 
and how does a constitutional reading of foreign policy illuminate our understanding of the 
drivers of Iranian Foreign Policy? The following sub-questions will also be considered: Is an 
ideological foreign policy exclusive from a practical foreign policy? If Iran does not act within the 
goals of the Constitution, why not?  
Section 1.2: Historical Background 
 Although the framework for this thesis was ratified in 1979 and amended in 1989, it is 
necessary to jump further back in history to understand the conditions in which the current 
Constitution had the opportunity to come about because the Constitution is a reflection of the 
revolutionary sentiments held at the time of its inception. Without understanding the Pahlavi 
dynasty and the White Revolution, which is thought to have led to the Pahlavi dynasty’s downfall, 
one cannot understand the rise of Khomeini and the reason for the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
The Pahlavi dynasty was formed in 1925 when Reza Khan was named the new Shah, four 
years after he helped orchestrate the 1921 coup, which used Iran’s military forces to combat the 
ruling Qajar dynasty. Reza Khan’s role in replacing the inefficient and weak Qajar Dynasty in the 
coup paved the way for him to be War Minister, Prime Minister, and eventually Shah.5 However, 
Reza Khan’s rise to being Shah was not a natural transition of power, and it required Iran’s 
parliament to amend the 1906 Constitution, replacing the Qajar dynasty with the Pahlavi dynasty 
 
5 Mostofi, Khosrow, and Janet Afary. 2020. “Rise of Reza Khan.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Iran/Rise-of-Reza-Khan. 
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as the legitimate sovereigns of Iran.6 The ushering in of this new dynasty also marked the ushering 
in of a new Iran, with ambitious plans for the modernization of Iran. These plans included 
implementing new infrastructure projects, strengthening the middle and working classes, and 
establishing a public education system, among other goals. However, the idea of having a strong 
central government which heavily relied on the individual decisions of the Shah created discomfort 
among religious and intellectual elites.7 
 In 1941, British and Soviet forces occupied Iran in a military invasion, forcing Reza Shah 
to abdicate his power to his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. This created enough political stability 
in Iran that Iran became a major conduit of British and American aid throughout WWII in a supply 
effort known as the Persian Corridor.8 The transition of power from father to son went smoothly, 
with the Pahlavi Dynasty now having the backing of the Allied Powers. More than a decade later, 
this alliance would continue to benefit Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, with those who originally 
installed him into power interfering once again to keep him in power.  
 The leadership of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh marked a political shift in which 
Iran attempted to nationalize Iran’s oil industry and expel foreign corporate representatives from 
the country. This greatly impacted the control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British 
company which had control over Iranian oil reserves. As Soviet forces never withdrew from Iran 
in the aftermath of WWII, there was a growing fear that Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh 
would pave the way for communism to take hold in Iran once British and American friendly 
businesses were nationalized. Acting on this fear, the CIA orchestrated a coup in 1953, which 
 
6 Berger, Miriam. 2020. “The divisive legacy of Iran's royal family.” The Washington Post. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/16/divisive-legacy-irans-royal-family/. 
 
7 Central Intelligence Agency. 1979. “The Iranian Constitution: A Reference Aid.” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00942A000600070002-0.pdf. 
 
8 The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/persian/index.htm. 
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removed the Mohammed Mosaddegh from power and Fazlollah Zahedi replaced him as Prime 
Minister.9 In the aftermath of the 1953 CIA coup, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ruled more firmly as 
a monarch, and he continued to rely heavily on support from the United States. 
 Although Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was installed and kept in power by way of foreign 
influence, he attempted to reform Iranian society in many of the same ways his father had. This 
included pursuing a policy of increasing Iranian power and independence by minimizing foreign 
influence. Ultimately, Pahlavi’s dream was for Iran to reclaim its place as a Great Civilization, 
which prompted many of his industrial, military, economic, and social reforms. The peak of these 
reforms occurred during the White Revolution, which was ushered in with the intention of 
transforming Iran into a global power.10 However, the Shah’s wish to better Iran’s standing on the 
global stage would ultimately lead to his downfall.  
The White Revolution, named for being a bloodless revolution, stemmed from a series of 
social, economic, and political reforms begun by the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, in 1963. The 
reforms were aimed to modernize Iran and legitimize the Pahlavi dynasty by finding support in 
groups that were typically disenfranchised such as the peasantry. Despite the attempt to reform a 
system which the Shah saw as unreliable for long-term stability, his reforms actually led to new 
social tensions which would inevitably create some of the same problems he had been hoping to 
avoid.11 However, it is not as if the Shah was blind to these newfound tensions, although he 
believed that it was in the way he had implemented the reforms, not the reforms themselves. In a 
1973 interview, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was asked whether he would deny that he was a rather 
 
9 Kinzer, Stephen. 2003. All the Shah's men: the hidden story of the CIA's coup in Iran. Wiley. 
 
10 Mostofi, Khosrow, and Peter William Avery. 2020. “The White Revolution.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Iran/The-White-Revolution. 
 
11 Maloney, Suzanne. 2019. “1979: Iran and America.” Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/1979-iran-
and-america/. 
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authoritarian ruler, to which he responded, “No, I wouldn’t, because, in a sense, I am. To go 
through with reform, one can’t help but be authoritarian… only the strictest authoritarianism can 
ensure reform; otherwise nothing can be achieved.”12  
The White Revolution contributed to economic and technological advancement for Iran, 
but the revolution also contained reform programs which were utter failures or brought no change 
at all. Failed programs only flamed the resentment of the demographics which the Shah was 
targeting for support through these reforms. This coupled with anger from those that had 
previously benefited from the more traditional system, such as religious leaders and landowners, 
would lead to the Shah’s downfall and the 1979 Iranian Revolution – the exact thing the White 
Revolution was put in place to prevent. 
Changes from the White Revolution also challenged the role of Iran’s religious leaders as 
a dominant force, with most fearing that they would lose power and authority under the Pahlavi 
dynasty. Not only were religious figures disgruntled by these changes which upended their 
traditional way of life, but other portions of the population were beginning to become frustrated 
with the Shah as well. For instance, academics who had long been annoyed with autocratic rule 
and corruption hoped for more democratic reforms during the White Revolution. The middle class 
also became angry because they received little benefit from neither the White Revolution’s 
development plans nor the growth of the oil industry throughout the 70s.13 Although arguably the 
aims of the revolution were to counter the already growing hostilities of the middle class rather 
than appeal to them, their further alienation did not help the Shah in any way. 
 
12 “The Shah of Iran: An Interview with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.” 1973. The New Republic. 
https://newrepublic.com/article/92745/shah-iran-mohammad-reza-pahlevi-oriana-fallaci. 
 
13 Armajani, Yahya. 1979. “What the U.S. Needs to Know About Iran.” Worldview 22(5): 13–19. 
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These factors helped contribute to the rise of leaders such as Ruhollah Khomeini, better 
known as Ayatollah Khomeini, who was arguably a relatively unknown figure until these reforms 
began. He was one of the first clerics to openly criticize the White Revolution, framing it as an 
injustice to the masses, the exact opposite of what the Shah had in mind.14 By fearlessly critiquing 
the Shah’s reforms, Khomeini was able to capture the support of religious leaders and the 
disgruntled middle class, allowing him to further spread his revolutionary ideology.  
Khomeini was exiled from Iran by the Shah in 1964, after two years of preaching sermons 
and passing out leaflets critical of the Shah’s regime, as well as on the Shah’s land reform and 
women’s rights programs. Despite being exiled, Khomeini continued to broadcast his message to 
his following in Iran from Iraq. He was subsequently thrown out of Iraq a few years later from the 
fear of the Iraqi government that his message would resonate with Iraqis and create the same 
currents of frustration as seen in Iran. However, exile did not stop Khomeini, and he continued to 
send his messages to Iran via audio tapes he would record in France. Examination of these speeches 
by the Central Intelligence Agency found that Khomeini continuously argued that the Shah was 
anti-Islamic and the monarchy as an institution had become opposed to Shia Islam. In his wish to 
replace the Pahlavi dynasty, Khomeini proposed an Islamic Republic for which “the only reference 
point would be the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the Imam Ali,” a vague proposal meant to 
unite his vast population of followers who all could find different purposes in his message. 15  
The culmination of these increasingly revolutionary attitudes occurred on what is known 
as Black Friday, one of the most notorious clashes between the opponents of the Shah and the 
 
14 “Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran.” 2010. History.com. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ayatollah-
khomeini-returns-to-iran. 
 
15 Central Intelligence Agency. 1978. “The Politics of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010002-9.pdf. 
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Shah’s security troops. On September 08, 1978, nearly 20,000 demonstrators were fired on in 
Tehran, with hundreds being killed and thousands more being wounded. Many of these 
demonstrations were to call for an end to Western corruption in Iran, an issue in which much of 
the blame was placed on the Shah.16 Two months later, on December 10 and 11 of 1978, a group 
of soldiers held a mutiny by attacking the Shah’s security officers. Subsequently, Pahlavi’s regime 
collapsed, and he fled Iran.17 
Khomeini returned to Iran in February of 1979, and he began to establish control within 
the power vacuum left behind by the no longer standing Pahlavi dynasty. He cleaned house by 
removing officials left behind by the Shah and appointed a new Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan. 
Bazargan was thought to favor democracy, leading many to believe that the new government 
would succeed where the White Revolution failed.18 In March of 1979, Iranians voted on the new 
form of government via referendum, and Khomeini declared the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as “the first day of a Government of God” on April 01, after receiving 98.2% of 
the vote.19 The Constitution of this newly formed government was ratified in December of the 
same year with 99.5% of the vote, giving the young Islamic Republic a document in which 
revolutionary goals could be pursued within the confines of government.20 
 
16 “Timeline of the Iranian revolution.” 2019. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-revolution-
anniversary-timeline/timeline-of-the-iranian-revolution-idUSKCN1Q017W. 
 
17 Maloney, Suzanne, and Keian Razipour. 2019. “The Iranian revolution-A timeline of events.” Brookings. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/. 
 
18 Youssef. 1979. “IRAN'S NEW PREMIER NAMES 7 TO CABINET; KHOMEINI ASKS CALM.” The New York 
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/14/archives/irans-new-premier-names-7-to-cabinet-khomeini-asks-calm-
a-foe-of.html. 
 
19 Jaynes, Gregory. 1979. “Khomeini Declares Victory in Vote For a 'Government of God' in Iran.” The New York 
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/02/archives/khomeini-declares-victory-in-vote-for-a-government-of-god-
in-iran.html. 
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Although the Islamic Republic of Iran was in its earliest days, the newly formed 
government was extremely quick in taking actions which fell in line with their revolutionary ideals, 
even though they resembled much more spontaneous decision making than strategic policy at this 
point. In November of 1979, Iranians stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran, taking more 
than sixty Americans hostage. Khomeini declared that he would not release any of the American 
hostages until the United States apologized for its support of the Shah, among other demands. The 
hostages were eventually released in January of 1981 when Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as 
President of the United States of America, succeeding President Jimmy Carter.21  
At first glance, the timing of the release would imply that the hostage crisis strategically 
occurred due to the Carter Administration’s friendly relations with the Pahlavi dynasty which had 
just been overthrown, a relationship which had led President Carter to even label Iran an “island 
of stability” just one year prior to the revolution.22 However, the hostage crisis represented 
something much larger than liking one Presidential administration more than another, it was a 
dramatic event which signified a break with American interference in Iranian affairs.  
Khomeini used the fervor of the hostage taking to mobilize radical Islamic students against 
Bazargan, one of the pillars of reason in his administration. Khomeini became the Supreme Leader 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and he used his unlimited powers to eliminate opponents.23 After 
 
20 Basravi, Zein. 2019. “Iran's referendum and the transformation to the Islamic Republic.” Middle East | Al Jazeera. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/iran-referendum-transformation-islamic-republic-
190330210626860.html. 
 
21 U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises. 
 
22 Glass, Andrew, and Politico Magazine. 2018. “Carter lauds shah of Iran, Dec. 31, 1977.” POLITICO. 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/30/this-day-in-politics-december-31-1077103. 
 
23 James. 1979. “20 MORE SHAH AIDES SAID TO FACE DEATH IN START OF A PURGE.” The New York 
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/17/archives/20-more-shah-aides-said-to-face-death-in-start-of-a-purge-
regime.html. 
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continuous attacks on those who took a more liberal stance, including his own President 
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who fled Iran in February of 1981, he went on to even repress religious 
figures he believed to be his political opponents.24 
Khomeini went on to fill key positions in government with those he believed to be his 
closest religious allies. He also conducted a purge of Western (or “un-Islamic”) elements from 
universities, newspapers, and other cultural institutions, thereby limiting the freedoms which 
Iranians once held. Many Iranians quickly found themselves living under a politically and socially 
repressive regime.  
Although the clerical regime was designed to fix Khomeini’s insecurities, it led to more 
problems and ideological conflicts. For instance, conservative clerics in the Council of Guardians, 
the group created to ensure adherence to Islamic code and the constitution, vetoed reform 
legislation proposed by the less conservative Iranian Parliament. Those who wished for reform 
wanted to nationalize industries and change the way land was distributed, while more conservative 
clerics, who controlled much of the land, were clearly opposed to such reform. Clerics not only 
opposed such reform, but also wanted to take it a step further by pursuing a stricter religious policy 
than their opponents. These disagreements led to a blatant stalemate which ultimately paralyzed 
their ability to do anything domestic policy related.25 
 In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. This conflict allowed for a temporary distraction 
from the internal issues taking place with domestic policy. The invasion was caused in part by 
 
 
24 “Khomeini regime committed gross human rights abuses, finds tribunal.” 2012. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/04/khomeini-regime-human-rights-abuses. 
 
25 Borden, Emma, and Suzanne Maloney. 2016. “Iran's Guardians' Council has approved a record-low percentage of 
candidates. What will that mean for the upcoming vote?” Brookings.  
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/02/24/irans-guardians-council-has-approved-a-record-low-
percentage-of-candidates-what-will-that-mean-for-the-upcoming-vote/. 
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Saddam Hussein’s desire to end propaganda directed towards his regime.26 Iran was not able to 
turn the tide of the conflict their way until the spring of 1982, when they began to utilize child 
“martyrs” in their fighting.27 Emboldened by this shift, Khomeini showed his true colors by 
declaring that he was determined to see his revolutionary goals be spread throughout the region. 
This led those nations put at risk by this declaration to attempt to contain Iran, even seeking the 
support of the United States in order to do so.  
 As the costs of the war grew exponentially – both human and financial – attention turned 
back to Iran’s internal failures and pressure grew to stop the stalemate between hardline 
conservatives and reformers. Khomeini eventually intervened on behalf of the reformers in 
Parliament, in order to give certain institutions more authority. Khomeini was also encouraged to 
end the war with Iraq and start economic reconstruction, which led Khomeini to create a new body 
called the Expediency Council, which was given the power to override vetoes.28 In order to 
legitimize this new power, Khomeini supported the amending of the constitution, which was 
passed after his succession by Ali Khamenei.29 
 As Iranians hoped that this new version of their constitution would bring them greater 
social freedom, like they had pre-Iranian Revolution, many supported the changes in part because 
President Rafsanjani instilled that hope in people. However, the amended constitution may have 
 
 
26 History.com Editors. 2009. “Iran-Iraq War.” History.com. https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/iran-iraq-
war. 
 
27 Hardy, Roger. 2005. “Middle East | The Iran-Iraq war: 25 years on.” BBC News.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm. 
 
28 “The Expediency Council.” Iran Data Portal. https://irandataportal.syr.edu/political-institutions/the-expediency-
council. 
 
29 “Iran Lawmakers Ask Khomeini to Amend Constitution 'Flaws'.” 1989. Los Angeles Times. 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-04-17-mn-1964-story.html. 
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placed clerics on equal footing with politicians, but it also gave the government more power to 
impose its decisions on the masses. Subsequently, the goals of the Iranian Revolution were 
institutionalized through political figures who now held the power to legally pursue them. 
Section 1.3: Methodology and Framework 
 In order to answer the question of to what extent does Iranian foreign policy reflect the 
goals outlined by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and how does a constitutional 
reading illuminate our understanding of the rationality of Iranian foreign policy, I will first attempt 
to define the parameters of when foreign policy is constitutional, when it is rational, and how these 
two competing ideas interact with one another. The objective of this is to approach the topic of 
Iran’s foreign policy through an independent framework in order to deliver new information on 
this under-researched topic. 
 The starting point for this framework will be to set a base understanding of what it means 
for Iran’s foreign policy to be “constitutional.” Essentially, this will determine whether or not 
Iranian foreign policy acts in accordance with their constitution. In order to do so, I will turn to the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran because it serves as a constant, long-term strategic 
document which can be applied to any of the foreign policy cases which will be presented 
throughout this paper, whereas individual policies would not serve as a good starting point due to 
being much more tactical and short-term in nature. As constitutions are thought to embody the 
fundamental principles under which a state is governed, examining the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran offers a first-hand view of Iran’s governing philosophy.  
 The legitimization of power in post-revolution Iran came by way of a two-day referendum 
held on March 30, 1979, and March 31, 1979. The referendum asked a simple question of voters: 
should Iran become an Islamic Republic? Although the results of the referendum were highly 
 13 
criticized internationally, the referendum passed with 98.2% of the vote. A second referendum was 
later held in December of the same year in which Iranian voters showed an overwhelming support 
(99.5%) for the ratification of the new Islamic constitution.30 Despite these nearly unanimous 
passages, these referendums are only indicative of what voters wished for, not what the electorate 
wanted. For instance, Kurdistan saw heavy boycotts of the referendums so many voters did not 
vote despite their clear distaste for the passage of either referendum.31 Ballots were also done in 
the open, with different colored “yes” or “no” ballots being easily seen by any observers. However, 
a spokesman for Khomeini still declared the referendums to be a “completely free vote,”32 and the 
referendums of 1979 serve as a cornerstone for the democratic creation of a theocratic system – 
fusing religion and politics in order to create the Islamic Republic of Iran. Essentially, all eligible 
voters legally gave a green light to a regime which would in turn, solidify the revolutionary 
aspirations for generations to come through official government documents.  
This includes not only the Constitution’s original version in 1979 under the rule of 
Ruhollah Khomeini, but also the subsequent amendments passed via referendum by 97.6% in 1989 
which shifted power sharing within the government. Although the amendments were passed after 
the death of Khomeini and upon the rise of Ali Khamenei to the position of Supreme Leader of 
Iran, a lack in continuity in power should raise no concern as to how amendments may contradict 
the original document because Khomeini was the one to appoint a twenty-five man Council for 
 
30 Koven, Ronald. 1979. “Khomeini Decrees Islamic Republic After Vote in Iran.” The Washington Post. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/04/02/khomeini-decrees-islamic-republic-after-vote-in-
iran/c4d11a54-8981-4b91-8ca0-7d9771a8cf2c/. 
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the Revision of the Constitution prior to his death.33 The Constitution has many articles dedicated 
to outlining the goals in formulating Iran’s foreign policy.  
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran outlines the foreign policy goals of the 
Islamic Republic in Chapter X: Foreign Policy: 
“Article 152: The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all 
forms of domination – both the assertion of it and submission to it – preservation of the country’s 
all round independence, its territorial integrity, defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment 
with hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of peaceful relations with all non-belligerent 
States. 
 
Article 153: Any kind of agreement resulting in foreign control of the country’s natural resources, 
economy, army, culture, and other aspects of national life, is forbidden.  
 
Article 154: The realization of human felicity throughout human society is the ideal of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and it considers independence, freedom, and the rule of justice and truth to be the 
right of all people of the world. Accordingly, whilst scrupulously refraining from all forms of 
interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the struggle of the mustad’afun 
(oppressed) against the mustakbirun (tyrants) for their rights in every corner of the globe.  
 
Article 155: The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran may grant political asylum to those 
who seek it unless they are considered to be traitors and criminals according to the law of Iran.”34 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides further context on how 
the Constitution intends to embody the goals of the Revolution as an ideological document:  
“The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the cultural, social, political, and 
economic institutions of Iranian society on the basis of Islamic principles and norms, which 
represent the earnest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah. This basic aspiration was made explicit by 
the very nature of the great Islamic Revolution of Iran, as well as the course of the Muslim people's 
struggle, from its beginning until victory, as reflected in the decisive and forceful slogans raised 
by all segments of the populations. Now, at the threshold of this great victory, our nation, with all 
its being, seeks its fulfilment.  
 
The basic characteristic of this revolution, which distinguishes it from other movements that have 
taken place in Iran during the past hundred years, is its ideological and Islamic nature… The idea 
 
33 Youssef. 1989. “Iran Quickly Appoints Successor to Khomeini.” The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/iran-quickly-appoints-successor-to-khomeini.html. 
 
34 “Islamic Parliament of Iran.” Islamic Parliament of Iran - Constitution. 
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of Islamic government based upon wilayat al-faquh (rule of the jurist), as presented by Imam 
Khomeini at the height of the period of repression by the despotic regime, was pathbreaking for a 
genuine struggle based on Islamic teachings. It produced a new well-defined and consistent motive 
for the Muslim people, giving a new impetus to the struggle of militant and committed Muslims 
both within the country and abroad.”35 
 
Through examining the foreign policy chapter of the Constitution, six prerequisites for what I will 
deem as a “constitutional” foreign policy can be found: reject forms of dominance, preserve 
independence, preserve territorial integrity, defend the rights of all Muslims, avoid alignment with 
hegemonic superpowers, and maintain peaceful relations with non-belligerent states. So, a 
constitutional foreign policy must meet a simple majority of the criteria outlined in Chapter X of 
the Constitution. A majority will be met when half of the actively pursued criteria are met or not 
met. If any portion of the criteria are not thought to be met because they do not pertain to the policy 
at hand, they will be characterized as being met passively and not count towards the simple 
majority of criteria. However, other descriptive factors which show that a constitutional foreign 
policy in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran is separate, though not necessarily exclusive, of 
a rational foreign policy can be found in the Preamble of the Constitution. The Preamble reflects 
the idea that this document is inherently ideological, as evidenced by the idea that the Constitution 
is to reflect the aspirations made explicit by the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The revolution itself 
is then described as “ideological and Islamic” in nature.  
 As a constitutional foreign policy does not immediately exclude rational foreign policy, the 
rationality of Iran’s foreign policy will be adapted from rational choice theory and descriptive 
decision theory. Rational choice theory rests on the idea that it is sufficient to know an actors’ 
interests and assume that they pursue them rationally, with history and culture being largely 
 
35 “Islamic Parliament of Iran.” Islamic Parliament of Iran - Constitution. 
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irrelevant to understanding political behavior.36 However, as rational choice theory relies on 
quantitative data, I will place the standards of rational choice theory against the mechanics of 
descriptive decision theory. Descriptive decision theory operates on the idea that observed 
behaviors can be described often under the assumption that the decision-maker behaves 
consistently.37 So, I argue that Iran’s foreign policy operates rationally, and rationality will be 
determined by whether or not they have factors other than ideology, history, and culture, as the 
primary determinant of their policy. Foreign policy decisions do not have to be completely 
exclusive of these three factors to qualify as rational, but these factors must not be the primary 
drivers of the policy in question.  
 Since Iran’s foreign policy is made by a collective group rather than any singular 
individual, I will also use the framework of rationality as the goals of the national policy rather 
than the individual interests of those who put the policy in place. Therefore, Iran’s foreign policy 
does not rest on the rationality of any man or woman, but rather on the rationality of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as a collective governing body. 
Based on these definitions of rationality and constitutionality, both ideas do not 
automatically exclude the other. So, each case presented throughout this paper will be determined 
through empirically rooted analysis as being rational-constitutional, rational-unconstitutional, 
irrational-unconstitutional, or irrational-constitutional. These labels will allow me to better 
determine how a constitutional reading of foreign policy affects our understanding of the 
rationality of Iran’s foreign policy.  
 
36 Riker, William H. 1995. “The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory.” Political Psychology 16(1): 23. 
 
37 “Overview of Descriptive Decision Theory.” An Introduction to Decision Theory: 311–322. 
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The methodology of this research relies on a qualitative approach. First, I have identified 
three areas of foreign policy which highlight the different characterizations within Iran’s foreign 
policy: engagement with regional actors, interactions with global actions, and exportations of 
intersectional domestic and foreign policy. These three categories are rooted in a commonality of 
preserving the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as emphasized by the Constitution; 
however, their differences will provide a more accurate assessment of the fluidity of their foreign 
policy. Upon further examination, the preservation of interests is created through different means 
depending on how close to home the issue stands.  
Although Iran’s approach to foreign policy will shift depending on the case at hand, my 
analysis will not differ throughout the three areas. Rather, I will use open source analysis to collect 
data from primary sources such as government documents, political speeches, news articles, and 
intelligence reports, as well as secondary sources such as scholarly articles. Open source data, 
primarily that which comes from government or intelligence agencies will play a considerable role 
in my research as these sources tend to rely on consolidating raw, factual data, which I can in turn 
use to create my own analysis. 
As I am operating with primary sources, I will also rely on textual analysis in which I 
compare the letter and action of documents against one another, as opposed to a larger theory. I 
am not arguing whether or not Iran’s foreign policy is rational on a global scale, but whether or 
not Iran’s foreign policy is rational for Iran; therefore, Iran’s foreign policy can only be analyzed 
against its actions and its constitutional framework. This also allows for me to operate within the 
grounded theory in which data has been collected, analyzed, and then debated. 
In order to understand the full picture of Iran’s foreign policy, I strategically selected cases 
in which Iran strikes a fine balance between constitutionality and rationality. Additionally, it was 
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imperative to the research to restrict cases due to time constraints and the plentiful material 
available on this topic. This holds true in all three areas of research with juxtapositions between 
Iraq and Israel, United States of America and China, and the nuclear program and proxy groups.  
In Iran’s foreign policy, this balance has been struck depending on the time and the place. 
Even when the exportation of Iran’s ideology was at its peak in the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution, this dissemination of ideas was primarily confined to the Gulf region. The balance was 
also never tipped 100% in favor of expansionist goals but actually was kept in check by times of 
pragmatism, such as the release of American hostages by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1981. 
In order to comprehend the balance between Iran’s ideological goals as presented by the 
Constitution and practical foreign policies, I will apply the previously identified goals of the 
Constitution to actions taken by Iran in the context of Iraq, Israel, the United States of America, 
China, the Iran Nuclear Program, and the use of proxy groups, to determine whether or not Iran 
has taken a practical stance, an ideological stance, or a combination of the two. By examining these 
six key areas of Iran’s foreign policy, I will make the determination that Iran does make rational, 
pragmatic policy decisions, and that these decisions are necessary for the success of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
Section 1.4: Overview of Chapters 
 The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is complex with subtle shifts that create 
an evident pattern that Iran’s foreign policy is not static, but rather fluid and practical. In order to 
defend this idea, it is necessary to examine critical cases of Iranian foreign policy which differ in 
goal and outcome regarding regional, global, and intersectional interactions. 
 In chapter two, I will begin by analyzing two key cases in Iran’s regional policy: Israel and 
Iraq. These two cases most directly relate to a more mainstream understanding of foreign policy 
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as they encapsulate direct interaction between two countries in the countries themselves. Regional 
actors also relate most directly to the regional dominance Iran wishes to obtain.  
Chapter three will explore Iran’s interactions with global superpowers such as the United 
States of America and China. In the context of this chapter, we will observe two global powers 
who primarily interact with Iran in the Middle East, not within their own borders. In this case, 
global powers either pose a threat to Iran’s regional interests (United States) or offer relief to Iran 
(China). 
Chapter four will once again break the boundaries of what is more generally regarded to 
be foreign policy. This chapter will focus on the intersectional issues which are domestically 
engineered but not confined to the borders of Iran, primarily in the context of their nuclear program 
and their exportation of the revolution through the use of proxy groups. These intersectional 
policies will be found to be deterrence policies rather than expansionist, which falls squarely in 
the realm of foreign policy despite being domestic programs. 
After exploring these three areas of foreign policy, I plan to further analyze these six cases 
of Iranian foreign policy in order to determine the relationship between rationality and 
constitutionality in their foreign policy. This chapter will look at Iran’s foreign policy as a whole 
rather than by the individual policies which Iran pursues. 
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Chapter Two: Regional Interactions 
 Any country with a foreign policy doctrine will have policies which are applicable to 
neighboring states. The differences in regional foreign policies are not whether or not a country 
has one, but what the purpose of that policy is. Is the policy one rooted in friendly diplomacy, or 
is it an expansionist policy which threatens the sovereignty of surrounding nations?  Either way, 
countries should be invested in the well-being of its neighbors, as instability in one can be 
disruptive to the welfare of others. Countries can diverge as to how they go about pursuing regional 
security, but no nation is exempt from having a regional foreign policy, Iran included.   
This chapter will focus on Iran’s regional foreign policy, specifically in the Middle East. 
Iran’s regional foreign policy is absolutely crucial in comprehending its broader foreign policy as 
the majority of Iranian interests are in the region. So, in order to gain a comprehensive view of 
Iran’s regional interactions, I will examine Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq and Israel. These two 
countries were selected simply because Iran’s direct engagement with these two places is known 
globally. Second, Iraq and Israel offer different vantage points for our understanding of Iran’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East. This is due to Iraq and Israel being located in different 
geographical regions within the Middle East – Israel is squarely situated in the Levant, while Iraq 
is located in the Gulf region. The two also differ in their religious demographics, alliances, regional 
interests, and their purpose for Iran’s regional interest, which provides a more comprehensive 
perspective into regional interactions. 
First, I will start with examining Iran’s relationship with Iraq by detailing how their 
relations have evolved since the 1979 revolution, what Iran’s involvement in Iraq typically looks 
like, and what Iran’s goals in Iraq are. After that, I will analyze Iran’s policies towards Iraq in the 
context of this thesis’ framework in order to determine the constitutionality and rationality. I will 
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then repeat this process in the context of Iran’s foreign policy towards Israel by outlining their 
history, direct involvement, and future goals, before analyzing this information against the 
framework. After examining Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq and towards Israel, I will then 
conclude this chapter by discussing what these insights mean for Iran’s larger regional foreign 
policy.  
Section 2.1: Introduction to Iran’s Iraq Policy 
 Although Iran and Iraq share a history that can be traced back millennia, this thesis will 
only consider modern relations between Iraq and Iran that can be traced back to when Saddam 
Hussein, former president of Iraq, launched an invasion on Iran just months after the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution. Saddam Hussein deliberately started the war against Iran, a nation still disorganized 
by revolution yet fueled by revolutionary fervor, in what is now a disputed thought process as to 
whether it was over territorial disputes (as Hussein claimed) or over a fear that the revolution 
would cross over into Iraq.38 Either way, Saddam Hussein had drastically miscalculated the 
intensity in which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would lead his country, with Khomeini declaring 
in the early days of the war that Iran’s armed forces would fight until they had achieved “total 
victory.”39 Khomeini was not exaggerating that Iran’s forces would fight on no matter the cost, 
even employing child martyrs to run across minefields on the Iran-Iraq border so that troops could 
safely cross.40  
In 1988, after eight years of conflict, the war ended with the acceptance of UN Resolution 
598. Khomeini did clarify in the days following the ceasefire that for him, “taking this decision 
 
38 Riedel, Bruce. 2019. “What Iran's revolution meant for Iraq.” Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2019/01/24/what-irans-revolution-meant-for-iraq/. 
 
39 Ap. 1981. “KHOMEINI REBUFFS IRAQ AND URGES WAR UNTIL 'VICTORY'.” The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/29/world/khomeini-rebuffs-iraq-and-urges-war-until-victory.html. 
 
40 “Iran's child soldiers and the world's silent complicity.” 2019. Arab News. https://www.arabnews.com/node/ 
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was more deadly than taking poison.”41 The Iranian leader also warned that “accepting the 
resolution does not mean the question of war has been solved. By declaring this decision, we have 
blunted the propaganda weapon of the world devourers against us.”42 Based on Khomeini’s 
statements during this time period, the official war might have been over, but Iran harbored bitter 
sentiments, especially against Saddam Hussein.  
 Iran’s involvement, or lack thereof, during the 1990-1991 Gulf War was a divisive policy 
within Iran. The National Security Council declared that Iran would take a neutral stance in the 
Gulf War, a decision which was made in the rare attendance of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei, the successor to Ayatollah Khomeini. Prior to this declaration of neutrality, Ayatollah 
Sadegh Khalkhali, another Shia cleric most notable for advocating for turning conflicts into holy 
wars during his tenure in the Parliament of Iran from 1980 to 1992, argued before Parliament that 
Iran should not stay neutral. Rather, he believed that “we should not leave the Iraqi people standing 
alone in this battle, since if the United States emerges victorious it will not leave the region 
easily.”43 Even with the declaration of neutrality, Iran had supported UN resolutions against the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait while simultaneously breaking a trade embargo against Iraq by trading 
across their shared border.44 Although this was still a time of strained relations between Iran and 
Iraq, tensions had fallen relatively quickly considering the short time span between the Iran-Iraq 
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War and the Gulf War in large part because Saddam Hussein began to withdraw Iraqi troops from 
disputed territories out of fear that Iran had the power to forcibly expel the Iraqis from said 
territories.45 
Section 2.2: Aftermath of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
The fall of Saddam’s Ba’thist regime as a consequence of the 2003 invasion of Iraq on the 
part of the United States led to a normalization of relations between Iran and Iraq, although in this 
context normalization implies a return to friendly relations and largely ignores the fact that an 
opportunity had been presented for Iran to capitalize on Iraq’s insecurity to mold it into a stable 
and secure neighbor for Iran.46 With the evolution of their relationship from foes to friends to 
opportunities which must be taken advantage of, Iraq has been a foreign policy challenge for Iran. 
However, Iraq is also a critical foreign policy target for Iran as the two are neighboring countries 
whose stability relies on the stability of the other.  
Since 2003, Iran and Iraq have increased their diplomatic and economic relations with one 
another. In March 2008, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the first President of 
Iran to visit Iraq since the 1979 revolution.47 Former Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, also 
made several state visits to Iran during his tenure from 2006 to 2014.48 Such diplomatic relations 
were largely unprecedented for the two countries which shared a border, but it did not take long 
for them to become increasingly reliant on one another. In 2010, General Qassem Soleimani of the 
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Quds Force visited Iraq days after Vice President Joe Biden had returned to America from his 
official trip to Iraq for a military transition ceremony. A former Iraqi official anonymously 
revealed that Soleimani had said in a meeting with top Iraqi officials that “the Americans will leave 
you one day, but we will always remain your neighbors.”49  
Outside of these official shifts in relations, Iran has also been able to capitalize on Iraq’s 
insecurities by increasing Iranian influence in Iraqi politics by way of direct influence over 
politicians and through the presence of Iranian backed militias. Iran has pursued this key interest 
by building close relations with Shia factions which believe in establishing strategic relations with 
Iran.50 The bulk of this success has occurred in post-2003 Iraq, with Tehran playing a major role 
in the consolidation of Shia political and militant groups. Iran initially supported a large number 
of groups, ensuring that it would back eventual winners. Iran also frequently supported the 
formation of splinter groups when it feared that an ally was growing autonomous or less reliable. 
These groups were smaller and more dependent on Tehran and thus were more likely to act on the 
basis of Iranian interests.51 Some of Iran’s successes will last, as it is today and will remain for the 
foreseeable future the most influential external player in Iraq, especially as the United States 
continues its withdrawal from Iraq. The main Iraqi Shia groups are likely to maintain close ties 
with Tehran and remain dominant in Baghdad, especially the Popular Mobilization Forces, a proxy 
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group trained by the IRGC, who won forty-eight seats in Iraq’s 2018 Parliamentary elections.52 In 
addition, rivalry between Shia groups will continue to allow Iran to consolidate its position as an 
indispensable power broker. 
As the main Iraqi political parties have become more autonomous and focused on serving 
the interests of their domestic constituents, support for smaller, more violent militias has come to 
occupy an increasingly prominent role in Iran’s arsenal. This narrows its options and confronts it 
with consequences, such as Iraqi resentment, of supporting violence. Although Iran primarily relies 
on militias in order to exert its influence in Iraq, this does not indicate that Iraq must be in a state 
of war for Iran to prosper in Iraq, rather the militias have shifted themselves into a peace-time role 
of running for political office.53 
This growing influence in a more unofficial capacity has helped ensure that Iran’s key 
interest in Iraq has been fulfilled: that Iraq would be neither led by a pro-United States or anti-Iran 
Sunni Arab nationalist regime, nor that it would collapse or break apart.54  
 Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq is formulated by Iran’s National Security Council, which 
has determined that the Iranian government would like to see a secure, stable, balanced, and united 
Iraq, as insecurity in Iraq could lead to insecurity in Iran. This spread of Iranian influence is more 
commonly known as the formulation of the “Shia Crescent,” an idea which plays upon the sectarian 
divisions in the region by pitting nations which are influenced by Iran and primarily Shia in 
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religious demographics against their Sunni counterparts in non-crescent countries.55 Although it is 
clear through either of these arguments for Iran’s intentions with Iraq that Iran wishes to spread its 
influence, the latter implies that it is for ideological reasons while the former argues that an Iranian-
stabilized Iraq is what is best for Iran. 
Section 2.3: Analysis of Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq 
 Although the usage of the term “Shia Crescent” implies that Iran’s growing influence in 
Iraq plays on sectarian divisions, a case for a rational foreign policy from Iran towards Iraq can 
still be made. Yes, the two nations have a long, shared history which may inform some of Iran’s 
policy goals; however, historical and cultural similarities are not the driving force of Iran’s Iraq 
policy. Rather, the idea which Iran’s National Security Council has put forth is that Iran’s vision 
is to see a secure and stable Iraq, a vision largely irreverent towards ideology, history, and culture, 
taking current instability much more into account.  
 The fluidity of Iran’s policy towards Iraq also signifies the rationality of the policy. The 
first decade of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s lifespan had a majority of its time taken up by the 
war with Iraq, a war which Iraq started. Despite this, Iran did not allow its grievances against 
Saddam Hussein to be the primary driver of its foreign policy, choosing to become allies with Iraq 
against the United States rather than carrying out an aggressive and hostile foreign policy towards 
Iraq. Although there may be semblances of ideology, history, and culture in Iraq-Iran relations, 
they are by no means the primary driving factor of Iran’s Iraq policy, making this policy rational 
based on rational choice theory.  
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 As outlined by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution, the six primary goals of Iranian 
foreign policy should be to reject forms of dominance, preserve independence, preserve territorial 
integrity, defend the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with hegemonic superpowers, and 
maintain peaceful relations with non-belligerent states. Based on the state of Iran-Iraq relations 
today with Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, it is easily inferred that Iran is most certainly not 
dominated by Iraq nor is Iranian independence directly threatened by Iraq. The only time which 
Iran’s territorial integrity has been threatened by Iraq would be in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq 
War, which was resolved as Saddam Hussein withdrew his troops in order to not provoke further 
embarrassment at the hands of Iran.  
 As Iran’s policy towards Iraq is independent of alignment with hegemonic superpowers as 
well as relations with non-belligerent states, these two criteria are not applicable in determining 
constitutionality. The final criterion is that Iran must defend the rights of all Muslims; however, 
this leaves ambiguous as to who all Muslims are to be defended from. So, if Iran is defending all 
Muslims from an outsider (ex: the United States) then they are successful in this goal; however, if 
Iran itself is not supposed to be the one to prey on Muslims, then their solidarity with Shia militias 
who may pose a threat to Sunni Muslims would not allow Iran to be successful in this goal. Either 
way, Iran meets a majority of the outlined constitutional goals so their foreign policy towards Iraq 
can be labeled as constitutional. Therefore, Iran’s policy towards Iraq is rational-constitutional. 
Section 2.4: Introduction to Iran’s Israel Policy 
 In order to understand the evolution of relations between Iran and Israel, we must take into 
account what relations between the two looked like prior to the 1979 revolution and how they 
changed in the aftermath of the revolution. During the time of the Pahlavi dynasty, there was a 
friendly relationship between the two nations, with Iran even being the second Muslim-majority 
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country to recognize Israel as a sovereign state in 1950.56 In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, Iran severed all diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel, although military 
cooperation continued as Israel supported Iran during the Iraq-Iran War. In the early days of the 
war, it was estimated that Israel sold Iran $500 million-worth of arms, paid for primarily in Iranian 
oil.57 
Section 2.5: Effects of the 1990s Geopolitical Reconfiguration  
Israel-Iran relations shifted to a state of hostility in the early 90s as the United States began 
to move into the region by way of the first Gulf War. At this point, the United States to Iran was 
“Great Satan” and Israel was “Little Satan” due to its close ties with the United States. A large part 
of this reaction was due to the United States’ official foreign policy at the time known as “dual 
containment,” which was an attempt on the part of the United States to contain Israel’s two most 
important adversaries, Iran and Iraq, in order to ensure that these two adversaries of Israel could 
not interfere with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.58 This policy also capitalized on a 
geopolitical reconfiguration in the Middle East onset by the end of the Cold War and fall of the 
Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union no longer in a position to provide security measures for Iran 
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or Iraq and the United States increasing its role in regional affairs, a turning point occurred in 
Israel-Iran relations.59   
This is also the time that rhetoric between Iran and Israel became more hostile, which 
coincides with Iran’s support for Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Former Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin and former president Shimon Peres began to spout rhetoric which harped 
on the danger that they believed Iran posed with Rabin referring to Iran as a “dark, murderous 
regime,” and Peres calling the regime “more dangerous than Hitler.”60 
 Current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has continued this rhetoric brought 
forth by his predecessors by being one of the world’s most outspoken critics on Iran’s policies, 
particularly regarding the nuclear program, informing Iran to “not test Israel’s resolve” by 
continuing such policies.61 However, this dangerous form of rhetoric has also been used by 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who called for Israel’s “annihilation” and talked about the 
“stinking corpse of the usurping and fake Israeli regime.”62 
 Even with the former Iranian president’s 2007 declaration that “Israel must disappear from 
the map,” Iran’s Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif explained that “Ahmadinejad was quoting 
the Ayatollah Khomeini who said that Israel would disappear from the pages of history.”63 Zarif 
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went on to explain that it would not be Iran’s policy to destroy Israel, as Iran’s policy and conduct 
would lead to its being destroyed by itself. To further solidify Iran’s stance on not wishing to lay 
destruction upon Israel, a spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement that “Zarif’s 
remarks are consistent with the permanent policy of Iran… Khomeini and Khamenei did say that 
Israel would disappear from the face of the earth within 25 years because of its policy, but they 
did not say Iran would be the one to destroy it… Iran does not threaten to destroy Israel, Israel is 
the one threatening to destroy Iran.”64 
 Just as Iran believes that Israel poses a genuine threat to its well-being, Israel holds the 
same opinion of Iran. In 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the following 
claim: “Our policy is clear, Israel will defend itself against any aggression and any attempt to 
violate its sovereignty.” However, Netanyahu then stressed that “Israel seeks peace” with Iran.65 
The indication that Israel has peaceful intentions with its relationship with Iran would be the first 
time Netanyahu made such a remark, as he is normally known to call for the destruction of Iran. 
The intentions of Netanyahu’s statement largely place blame on Iran for any conflict which may 
occur between the two nations, while also mirroring Iran’s statements that it is not its intention to 
enter into conflict with the other.   
 Although there is plenty of rhetoric as evidence of the hostility between the two, their 
mutual hostility also extends far beyond rhetoric. However, neither side has directly attacked the 
other, and war would not be in the strategic interest of either country. Instead, they have engaged 
in what could best be described as low-intensity conflict. Since Iran does not possess extensive 
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economic tools or conventional military assets to shape events, it must instead rely on ties to 
militant groups and the appeal of its anti-status quo policies. These limited options can constrain 
what Iran has the ability to do in the region: it can do little more than raise the costs for its 
adversaries of taking certain courses of action. So, Iran focuses much more on reducing Israel’s 
margin of influence. This is done through Iranian support for groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, 
although these groups are not under the complete control of Iran, they have common interests in 
curbing Israeli influence.66 Iran is also a champion for Palestinian rights, much to the concern of 
Israel. In the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, Palestinian Liberation Organization Chief, Yasir 
Arafat, was the first foreign leader to visit Iran, with Arafat stating, “today Iran, tomorrow 
Palestine.”67 Since then, Iran has offered significant financial support to Palestinian groups, 
namely Hamas, to fight against Israeli expansion into Palestinian territories.  
Section 2.6: Analysis of Iran’s Policy Towards Israel  
 As long as the current regimes of Israel and Iran remain in power, it is highly likely that 
the two will continue to have hostile relations with one another in the form of inflammatory 
rhetoric. This is in part due to Iran’s foreign policy with Israel, in which Iran exerts a rational-
constitutional policy. 
 The rationality of Iran’s foreign policy is based on the fact that Iran’s interactions with 
Israel are not dictated by historical, ideological, or cultural, differences between the two. First, 
there are no historical actions between the two which would offer an explanation for any 
inflammatory rhetoric which has taken place as Iran was the second majority-Muslim nation to 
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recognize Israel as a sovereign state. As the two have also not engaged in any direct conflict, it is 
impossible for any historical relations to have dictated the current policy of Iran to simply hurl 
insults at Israel. As far as ideological and cultural differences go, an argument could be made that 
statements made by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could be interpreted as anti-Semitic, which 
would be an ideological and cultural difference between the two. However, the fact that the 
statements in question were clarified as meaning the Israeli government is a threat unto itself 
largely neutralizes any threat that such statements may have posed to Israel as a Jewish state. 
Interpreting such rhetoric as anti-Semitic and being rooted in cultural differences would also be a 
poor interpretation as Iran has the largest Jewish population in the Middle East outside of Israel.  
Outside of inflammatory rhetoric, the final area to analyze would be statements made as 
there is little direct interaction between the two. As President Rouhani stated in a televised speech 
regarding Israel, “the government is working daily to prevent military confrontation or war.”68 As 
it is clear that neither Iran nor Israel want to engage in direct conflict with one another, and will 
only attack the other if attacked first, I would conclude that Iran’s policy towards Israel is rational. 
Neither country has reacted violently or irrationally to any claims the other has made, and all 
statements are rooted in their interpretation of they believe the other views them. It may be a 
vicious cycle of pointing fingers and calling names, but that does not mean it is irrational. 
 Iran and Israel share few direct interactions, which makes determining the constitutionality 
of Iran’s policy towards Israel difficult to determine as most of the qualifications of 
constitutionality will be met passively. For instance, while Israel may want to see the destruction 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and both countries would be happy to engage in conflict if 
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provoked, their current situation does not pose any threat to Iran’s independence or territorial 
claims. There are also currently no threats from Israel to dominate Iran’s sovereignty. Israel is not 
a non-belligerent state in the eyes of Iran, so they are not impeding any friendly relations with non-
belligerent states in their Israeli policy. Nor is Iran aligning itself with a hegemonic superpower in 
its policies against Israel as Israel is the one who is aligned with hegemonic superpower America. 
So, many of these constitutional criteria are met passively as they are not directly called into 
question based on the nature of Iran’s Israel policy. 
 The final criterion of constitutionality is to “defend the rights of all Muslims,” and this is 
the only criteria which I would argue Iran actively pursues. Through Iran’s policy of supporting 
the Palestinian territories, they are directly supporting and defending the rights of Muslims from 
persecution. Although Iran offers its support indirectly through groups such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas, it allows Iran the opportunity to defend these rights without directly engaging in conflict 
with Israel. So, it can be inferred by these criteria that Iran’s policy towards Israel is also 
constitutional, deeming this foreign policy rational-constitutional.  
Section 2.7: Discussion on Iran’s Regional Foreign Policy 
 Israel and Iraq pose different sets of challenges for the Islamic Republic of Iran; however, 
both cases have been determined as the Islamic Republic of Iran exercising a rational-
constitutional form of foreign policy. This implies that Iran’s regional policies, which I have 
determined to be a top priority for the Islamic Republic, are crafted so that their foundations do 
not rest on ideology, culture, or history, despite there being a lot of overlap between those three 
categories and the relationships between Iran and Iraq as well as Iran and Israel.  
For the constitutionality of both of these cases, constitutional criteria were met for the 
benefit of Iran actively or passively, with neither case meeting unconstitutional criteria. Its policies 
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allow Iran to either have an upper-hand when there is direct interaction or not directly interacting 
if Iran does not have the capabilities to have the upper-hand. This indicates that Iran crafts its 
regional policies so that Iran understands its own capabilities and ensures that neither 
constitutionality nor rationality are threatened.   
While Iran’s foreign policies towards Iraq and Israel are both rational-constitutional, Iran 
achieves this designation in different ways depending on the country in question. For Iraq, the 
policy has an air of expansionist goals in which Iran has increasingly gained power and prominence 
in Iraq through militias and government influence. This has been through direct interactions with 
Iraq, and these direct interactions have shifted over the decades based on what will be most 
beneficial for Iran at the moment. For Israel, Iran’s policy is much more hands off, doing its best 
to cause frustration for Israel but never directly engaging. Iran and Israel swap heated statements; 
however, neither has any intention to be the first to attack, making this policy less fluid but more 
hostile than Iran’s Iraq policy.  
Therefore, while Iran’s regional policy can be inferred to be rational-constitutional based 
on the results of these two cases, Iran’s policies are crafted specifically for the nation they are 
dealing with, rather than having a blanket policy for the entire Middle East. The goal of that policy 
might be the same – to achieve a regional security which benefits Iran – but Iran is aware that 
different countries pose different challenges to regional security. However, Iran is also careful to 
ensure that its regional policies are made in the context of that moment and help it pursue its 
ideological goals as outlined in the constitution, meaning that the framework can be applied to a 
host of other regional cases and it will be highly likely that those policies will also be rational-
constitutional, even if they all take different forms.  
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Chapter Three: Global Interactions 
 When the United States drives the notion that Iran poses a threat to global stability because 
of their regional policies, the reasoning behind how a regional policy can have global ramifications 
tends to be left unanswered. In doing so, a key to our understanding of Iran’s foreign policy is 
excluded, which is that there are key players in the Middle East who are not native to that region. 
Iran’s foreign policy is indeed largely limited to its regional policies; however, Iran must also 
interact with global powers who have inserted themselves into the Middle East, whether that be 
through military or diplomatic means. So, when examining Iran’s foreign policy in terms of its 
interactions with global powers, we must keep in mind that Iran interacts with these powers 
because they placed themselves in a position in which Iran must interact with them. 
 Whereas Iran’s regional policies tend to take the form of direct interactions between two 
countries within their own borders, Iran’s interactions with global powers, or great powers, tend 
to take a different shape. Iran’s foreign policy goals were once stated by General Qassem 
Soleimani, former head of the Quds Force, as, “today we see signs of the Islamic Revolution being 
exported throughout the region, from Bahrain to Iran and from Syrian to Yemen and North 
Africa.”69 So, Iran’s foreign policy is predominately executed regionally rather than globally as 
evidenced by the fact that their sphere of influence resides in the Middle East. Furthermore, this is 
backed up by the fact that Iran seems to typically interact with global powers when those powers 
attempt to exert their influence across the Middle East, an idea which will be explored throughout 
this chapter.  
 The two global powers whose interactions with Iran I will be examining are those of China 
and the United States. These two cases offer different perspectives on Iran’s global foreign policy, 
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one could be best described as reactionary while the other will be found to be much more remedial. 
In the case of Iran, reactionary policies tend to take shape in their interactions with the United 
States. These policies are often the result of action on the part of the United States, with Iran being 
provoked rather than being the primary instigator. Remedial policies are more prominent in their 
relationship with China, where these policies help Iran overcome stumbling blocks, such as a weak 
economy, in the way of pursuing their desired policies.  
 I will begin with Iran’s interactions with the United States – how has the relationship 
between the two evolved since the 1979 revolution, do they have a shared or competing interest, 
and how does Iran typically respond to the actions of the United States in the region. I will then 
analyze this data to determine the rationality and constitutionality of Iran’s foreign policy towards 
the United States. After I conclude this section, I will then repeat this process with the data that 
has been collected on China. I will then move on to the final section to discuss what these two 
cases say about Iran’s foreign policy towards global actors. 
Section 3.1: Introduction to Iran’s United States of America Policy 
 The 1979 Iranian Revolution saw a shift from Iran and the United States being allies to 
adversaries, largely due to the revolution’s goal of freeing Iran from the control of the Shah and 
American influence in the country. However, it should be noted at the height of great relations 
between the two prior to the revolution, Iran was still independent of the United States, aligned 
with but not controlled by America. In remarks given by President Trump on Iran, he stated that, 
“For far too long – all the way back to 1979, to be exact – nations have tolerated Iran’s destructive 
and destabilizing behavior in the Middle East and beyond. Those days are over. Iran has been the 
leading sponsor of terrorism, and their pursuit of nuclear weapons threatens the civilized world. 
We will never let that happen… As we continue to evaluate options in response to Iranian 
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aggression, the United States will immediately impose additional punishing economic sanctions 
on the Iranian regime. These powerful sanctions will remain until Iran changes its behavior.”70 
The true strength of Iran’s independence from America has continued revealing itself as many 
presidential administrations have attempted to alter the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
with little success, despite the wide range of tools used in US foreign policy such as economic 
sanctions, military threats, and diplomacy.71 
 Although relations between the two countries significantly cooled after 1979, avenues for 
collaboration were not completely shut down but more difficult to navigate. Throughout the 
Reagan presidency, the closest which Reagan came to working with Iran would also be an affair 
which would taint his and his successor’s presidencies. In the mid-1980s, Iran approached the 
Reagan Administration to help Iran purchase weapons for its war with neighboring Iraq. Although 
the United States had a trade embargo with Iran at the time and Reagan’s Secretary of State and 
Secretary of Defense both opposed giving support to Iran, National Security Advisor Robert 
McFarlane argued that an arms deal with Iran would help the United States with other problems it 
was facing in the Middle East at the time, such as the holding of American hostages by Hezbollah 
in Lebanon.872This collaboration between Iran and the United States helped Iran in its time of need 
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but created a scandal in America as $18 million of the $30 million which Iran paid for the weapons 
had been diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua.73  
Section 3.2: Aftermath of Iran-Contra  
The Iran-Contra scandal did not stop with the election of President George H.W. Bush and 
was so eager to work with Iran to win the freedom of the remaining hostages in Lebanon that he 
was tricked into taking a phone call by an unknown Iranian pretending to be Iran’s Parliament 
Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.74 Ultimately, relations between Iran and the United States 
during this time were largely stagnant, with little interaction let alone progress. This would also be 
the case for President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush until Bush’s “Axis of Evil” 
reference in his 2002 State of the Union address.75 Although that reference did not single handedly 
freeze relations between the two countries, it did make the idea of friendly relations between the 
two much more difficult.  
Of all the presidents since 1979, President Barack Obama has been most closely identified 
with breakthroughs in Iran-America relations although any developments were not done by Obama 
single handedly. Rather President Hassan Rouhani’s 2013 election helped pave the way for any 
negotiations between the two countries. Collaboration between the two peaked with the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was a large policy effort under the Obama 
Administration to keep an eye on Iran’s nuclear program.76 Although the JCPOA will be discussed 
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in more detail in the fourth chapter, it should still be noted that although the United States utilized 
economic sanctions throughout Iran’s noncompliance with the deal, only to step back from the 
deal under the Trump Administration.77 Now that Iran has also left the deal, there is no current 
American oversight on the Iranian nuclear program, which allows Iran to be out of the jurisdiction 
of nuclear-related sanctions. 
The Trump Administration has said that “Peace and stability cannot prevail in the Middle 
East as long as Iran continues to foment violence, unrest, hatred, and war. The civilized world 
must send a clear and unified message to the Iranian regime: Your campaign of terror, murder, 
mayhem will not be tolerated any longer. It will not be allowed to go forward.”78 Just from this 
quote alone, it is clear that Iran’s interests will be threatened by the United States, with any means 
necessary. The United States sees Iran as the destabilizing factor, while Iran believes the same 
thing regarding the United States. Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that, “Our number one enemy is 
America. It is the most wicked, sinister enemy of Iran… its leaders are terrorists…”79 
 A tweet from Ayatollah Khamenei is telling on how Iran views their interactions with the 
United States, “The villainous US govt repeatedly says that they are standing by the Iranian ppl. 
They lie. If you are standing by the Iranian ppl, it is only to stab them in the heart with your 
venomous daggers.”80 This tweet implies that Iran’s most powerful citizen holds the idea that the 
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United States is the instigator of Iran-America hostility. Although the United States could argue 
that Iran has also used inflammatory rhetoric through “Death to America!” chants and 
characterizing the United States as the “embodiment of evil,” Khamenei has also clarified these 
comments from a 2019 gathering of Iranian air force officers. The Supreme Leader’s website stated 
that, “I am telling the Americans, ‘Death to America’ means death to [President] Trump, [national 
security advisor] John Bolton, and [Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo. It means down with the 
American politicians in charge. We have no fight to pick with the American people.”81 However, 
he continued these remarks by adding, “As long as the United States shows viciousness and 
savagery, the Iranian nation will never cease shouting these words,” implying that although they 
named members of the Trump Administration, these feelings were not exclusive to Trump’s 
presidency.82 
There is also much more to the interactions between Iran and the United States outside of 
inflammatory rhetoric. By looking to direct actions taken between the two countries, their 
relationship can be better understood. These interactions also tend to take place outside of Iran, 
where Iran has a vested interest, but Iran’s interests also compete with those of the United States. 
The most recent example of both of these trends would be in Iraq, where both the United States 
and Iran want stability for the country; however, they both seem to believe that stability brought 
about by the other will be unstable conditions for themselves. One prominent example of the tit 
for tat policies which the two seem to engage in with one another would be evident in the United 
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States’ decision to assassinate General Qassem Soleimani. As tensions between Iran and the 
United States have escalated over the years, the Trump administration claimed that it was 
necessary to take out the General in order to prevent an ensuing attack against the United States 
by Iran in Iraq.83 After Soleimani was killed, Iran claimed to unintentionally shoot down a 
Ukrainian jetliner, with President Hassan Rouhani blaming the United States as being the reason 
that Iran was agitated enough to accidentally take such an action.84 A minor reaction from Iran, 
but a reaction, nonetheless. Of course, Iran could also be biding their time, but the lesser reaction 
to a greater attack is still indicative of Iran’s typical response to US actions. 
 Iran also tends to react when the United States places sanctions on Iran. For instance, on 
June 24, 2019, President Trump announced sanctions against Iranian and IRGC leadership after 
President Rouhani blamed high tensions between the two nations of the United States’ 
“interventionist military presence” in the aftermath of Iran shooting down a US drone which was 
thought to be flying over Iranian airspace.85 U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin later claimed 
the sanctions would block “billions” in assets for individuals being sanctioned.86 Iran responded 
to these sanctions by stating that they prompted a “permanent closure” of their diplomatic ties and 
refused to any future negotiations until the sanctions were lifted. The Foreign Affairs Minister of 
Iran even tweeted that the sanctions were not an “alternative to war; they ARE war.”87 Sanctions 
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towards Iran are nothing new for the United States to implement; however, a complete shutdown 
of diplomatic relations also indicates that Iran does not want to be bullied by the United States. 
For the most part, in interactions between the United States and Iran, it is clear that Iran is only in 
a position to defend itself from the United States, never to attack.  
 While these incidents have all taken place under the Trump Administration, every United 
States president has interacted with Iran either through a short-term policy objective or a longer-
term attempt at normalizing relations, according to declassified records published in 2019 by the 
National Security Archive. From the earliest days of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President Jimmy 
Carter attempted to establish positive relations with the newly formed government, despite have 
friendly ties to the recently overthrown Shah.88 These relations never came to fruition and were 
further strained by the hostage crisis which did not come to an end until President Reagan’s 
inauguration day.   
 Ultimately, every president has had Iran on their foreign policy agenda, but relations 
between the two largely rely on how perceptive Iran is to American wishes. What is also notable 
about relations between the United States and Iran over the past four decades is that although the 
two most recent administrations are dichotomous in the way Iran has worked with them, Iran’s 
feelings towards America do not rest on whether or not there is a Democrat or Republican in office. 
Rather, Iran works with America when it is beneficial for Iranian interests and does so irrespective 
as to who is in office.   
Section 3.3: Analysis of Iran’s Policy Towards the United States  
 The key elements in Iran’s policy towards the United States which must be taken into 
consideration to determine rationality and constitutionality are the way in which they interact and 
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the time in which that interaction took place. Iran’s policy towards the United States is confusingly 
historical while also not being rooted in history. First, it should be noted that Iran’s policy towards 
the United States is its policy towards the United States, not towards any one administration. 
Therefore, Iran does not rest its policy in any sort of historical differences between Democratic 
and Republican administrations. However, this also turns a blind eye to the fact that different 
administrations have tried more than others to restore friendly relations, meaning that Iran’s policy 
towards the United States has been unwavering despite there being opportunity for it to change.  
 Although there are cultural and ideological differences between the United States and Iran, 
Iran’s policy against the United States seems to be much more rooted in the fact that the United 
States’ involvement in the Middle East poses a direct threat to Iran’s regional interests rather than 
in those innate differences themselves. So, I argue that Iran’s opposition to the United States is not 
based on ideological or cultural differences, but rather that those differences impact the 
aggressiveness of Iran’s unforgiving policy towards the United States. So, the historical, cultural, 
and ideological drivers of Iran’s foreign policy towards the United States indicated that this is an 
irrational foreign policy based on our understanding of rational choice theory. That does not mean 
that the United States’ actions in the region do not prompt Iran to have a more aggressive policy, 
but the aggressiveness of the policy is not primarily driven by said actions.  
 In terms of constitutionality, Iran has largely fought against any action by the United States 
which puts Iran’s dominance and independence at risk, especially in battleground countries such 
as Iraq. However, because Iran’s interactions with the United States tend to take place outside of 
Iran’s borders, there is little threat to Iran’s territorial integrity.  
 The fact that most direct interaction between Iran and the United States takes place outside 
the borders of both nations and on the land of another sovereign nation does pose a problem for 
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Iran’s relations with non-belligerent states. However, as Iran believes that too much American 
influence in the region poses a direct threat to the rights of Muslims, the failure to keep non-
belligerent states happy with this policy is nullified by Iran’s necessity to follow this policy.   
 Finally, the issue of Iran aligning with hegemonic powers is difficult to determine in this 
case because Iran has not necessarily allied itself with the United States, but Iran has collaborated 
with the United States. These instances of collaboration both benefited Iran, such as the Iran-
Contra affair and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. However, because both of these 
instances required Iran’s cooperation and both instances are no longer applicable at present day, I 
argue that Iran has not aligned itself with a hegemonic power through its interactions with the 
United States; therefore, Iran’s foreign policy towards the US is irrational-constitutional.  
Section 3.4: Introduction to Iran’s China Policy 
 Unlike many of Iran’s relations with foreign countries, Iran’s relations to China saw 
minimal impact in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution as the two had very little contact. 
Over the past few decades, China and Iran have developed a broad and deep partnership centered 
on China’s energy needs and Iran’s abundant resources as well as significant non-energy economic 
ties, arms sales and defense cooperation, and strategic balancing against the United States. In 
particular, China’s policies have hampered U.S. and international efforts to dissuade Iran from 
developing a nuclear weapons capability.89 
The Iranian regime views China as a potential ally against the United States, and Beijing 
views Iran as a potential partner for limiting U.S. influence in the Middle East. The foundations of 
the economic partnership between Iran and China are Iran’s abundant energy resources and 
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China’s growing energy needs, but China is not overwhelmingly dependent on the Islamic 
Republic for its energy needs. On the flipside, Iran relies heavily on the support of China.90  
China is arguably Iran’s most important trade partner and oil client. Despite a drop in 
China’s importation of crude oil from 3 million to 600,000 tons from April to November of 2019, 
China has remained Iran’s sole liquefied petroleum gas client.91 Iran has also found itself with 
long-term potential to find economic development from China. With the Belt and Road Initiative, 
China announced plans to invest $400 billion in Iran’s energy, petrochemical, transport, and 
manufacturing infrastructure over the next twenty-five years.92 One such project is the Tehran-
Qom-Isfahan high-speed railway which will be constructed by China’s state-owned China Railway 
Group Limited and financed by Chinese credit.93 What is notable about China’s economic 
development is that it stands in defiance of mounting US sanctions on Iran; however, Chinese 
development of Iran also implies that Iran needs Chinese financial resources far more than China 
needs Iran as an economic partner.  
Outside of their economic relationship, China and Iran largely turn a blind eye to what the 
other does. Because of this, their relationship is best described as a convenient business partnership 
 
90 Berman II. 2011. To Stop Iran, Lean on China. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/opinion/irans-nuclear-program-and-china.html?searchResultPosition=48 
91 Rapoza K. 2020. China Wants To Save Iran Nuclear Deal As It Leaves Their Oil Market Behind. Forbes. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/01/06/china-wants-to-save-iran-nuclear-deal-as-it-leaves-their-oil-
market-behind/#11f90ba27ecd 
 
92 Girard B. 2018. China's BRI Bet in the Middle East. – The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/chinas-bri-
bet-in-the-middle-east/ 
 
Rapoza K. 2019. Drone Wars: China Has $400 Billion At Stake In Iran Oil. Forbes. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/09/16/drone-wars-china-has-400-billion-at-stake-in-iran-
oil/#717c25ad468a 
 
93 Tehran-Isfahan High Speed Rail (Construction). Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/database/projects/tehran-isfahan-high-speed-rail-construction/08745c54-5441-
4c84-900e-11454e62360e/ 
 
 46 
rather than being strategic partners. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, stated at a meeting with 
Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, that, “We need to stand together against 
unilateralism and bullying practices.”94 These bullying practices reference the United States’ 
predominant use of crippling economic sanctions against Iran, implying that Iran and China’s 
partnership is one of economic defiance. 
Section 3.5: Ignoring the Uighur Muslims 
Outside of their economic partnership, a key case study in how Iran’s best interest is not 
always in following a strict version of their guiding legal document is clear in the case of China, 
where Muslims are constantly persecuted, but it is in Iran’s best economic interest to turn a blind 
eye to these transgressions in order to not collapse. For instance, the mass detention and violence 
against Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang region of China would be an issue which any country 
wanting to “defend Muslims at home or abroad” would surely condemn.95 Not only has Iran taken 
no action against China for the persecution of Muslims, but Iran has not spoken out about the issue 
either. This lack of response implies that Iran is careful to extend their interactions with China 
outside of the economic realm due to their over-reliance on China for economic development. The 
Director for China at Human Rights Watch has explained that this is a larger trend with many 
Muslim countries, not just exclusive to Iran, that “China has managed to win these countries’ 
support because they need Chinese investment.”96 
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China’s role as a strong economic partner and a crucial provider of the investment and 
technology necessary for Iran’s economic development and modernization. Faced with U.S. and 
international sanctions, Iran lacks access to foreign capital and expertise to develop its struggling 
economy, which is essential to Iran’s regional and intersectional foreign policies. Outside of 
economic collaboration, there is little relation between China and Iran.97 
Section 3.6: Analysis of Iran’s Policy Towards China 
 Iran’s relationship with China is necessary for the sake of Iran’s economy. For the most 
part, the two have nearly zero interaction with one another outside of trade, and this has been true 
for the history of both countries, not just in recent decades. In terms of ideological and cultural 
differences between the two countries, these are largely ignored simply because Iran needs China’s 
support to help keep the Iranian economy afloat, as evidenced by Iran’s ignoring of the persecution 
of the Uighur Muslims in China. So, the policy Iran holds towards China is rational simply because 
it is one of economic necessity for Iran.  
 While Iran’s policy towards China is rational, it is at the sake of constitutionality. First, 
Iran has made itself economically dependent on another nation so that Iran can pursue its desired 
foreign policy against other nations. Since Iran’s more irrational foreign policies, such as that 
against the United States, are only able to be pursued because China is keeping Iran afloat, Iran 
has not preserved its full independence against China.  
 Second, Iran has betrayed the idea of defending the rights of all Muslims as there are 
Muslims persecuted in China. More than just not taking direct action against China for fear of 
retaliation, Iran has not even issued a statement to condemn China for such actions. So, Iran has 
compromised this portion of the Constitution because they believe it to be a necessary sacrifice.  
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In terms of rejecting forms of dominance, China may have control over Iran’s economic 
independence; however, China does not dictate any policies that Iran must pursue. If anything, 
China’s relationship with Iran is one of convenience, and China does not wish to dominate Iran. 
This is also true for Iran’s preservation of territorial integrity where China does not necessarily 
have an interest in taking territory away from Iran. Also, Iran’s relationship with China neither 
helps nor harms its relations with non-belligerent states.  
The final criterion is the most nuanced for Iran’s China policy as it states that Iran must not 
align with a hegemonic superpower. Although China is a great power, I would argue that it is not 
a hegemonic power. In foreign policy, hegemonic stability theory indicates that the international 
system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power, or 
hegemon. With this background information, it is clear that there can only be one hegemonic 
power, and as China is a rising power that may one day take on the title of hegemonic power, it is 
not the world’s hegemonic power at the time this thesis is being written. Rather, that designation 
goes to the United States. So, although Iran has aligned itself with a great power, it has not aligned 
itself with a hegemonic power through its policy with China. However, the fact that Iran’s China 
policy allows China a form of dominance over Iran as well as allows for the persecution of 
Muslims outweighs the fact that Iran is not aligned with a hegemonic power, making this policy 
rational-unconstitutional.  
Section 3.7: Discussion on Iran’s Global Foreign Policies 
 Iran’s global foreign policy in the context of the United States and China has produced 
mixed results, with the United States policy being categorized as irrational-constitutional and the 
China policy being categorized as rational-unconstitutional. Although I cannot make a call 
regarding the rationality and constitutionality of Iran’s global foreign policy based on these results, 
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there are still a couple of key takeaways as to what these characterizations mean for Iran’s global 
foreign policy.  
 First, Iran’s policies towards the United States and towards China have repercussions for 
how Iran can pursue its policies towards regional actors. Any action that Iran takes against the 
United States will be made regarding the United States’ involvement in the Middle East, where 
the two countries have goals which directly conflict with the goals of the other. In terms of China, 
Iran relies on its economic help so that Iran can pursue any of its policies, especially its more 
irrational ones which may be more costly.  
 Second, the fact that both China and the United States are global powers yet have attained 
different rationality-constitutionality outcomes indicates that Iran does not have a singular policy 
for all global powers. Rather, it indicates that Iran pursues policy options which benefit Iran’s 
interests, and it can be reasonably inferred that this would be the case for any global power this 
framework was used against, even if different results are found at the end of each case.  
 Finally, and most importantly, the cases of the United States and China are complementary 
to one another. Whereas the United States is the primary reason that Iran’s economy is in a state 
of disarray due to crippling sanctions, China’s involvement with Iran helps keep the Iranian 
economy from completely going under. So, this indicates that Iran is willing to compromise on the 
foreign policy goals as they are outlined in the Constitution, in order to offset its more irrational 
foreign policy goals. Therefore, Iran’s global foreign policy is much more of a balancing act, 
although it cannot be determined from this research as to whether Iran balances other global 
powers against only the United States, or if an irrational foreign policy would be the case for all 
Western nations.  
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Chapter Four: Intersectional Policies 
This chapter will focus on intersectional issues which are best described as the exportation 
of domestic policy, or domestic, intersectional policies which are not confined to the borders of 
Iran and have international implications. However, there is a difference between these policies and 
Iran’s foreign policy towards a specific country. These intersectional policies do not require Iran 
to interact with other countries in order to advance the policy; however, that it is not to say that the 
international community has to be indifferent to these policies. These policies will also be found 
to be primarily rooted in the idea of deterrence, rather than Iranian expansion, allowing them to 
both fall in the realm of foreign policy. In order to gain a proper understanding for how Iran’s 
domestic goals are able to intersect with their foreign policy, I have selected two cases which I 
believe capture just how wide of a range the idea of intersectional policies can cover while still 
capturing the idea that these policies are reflections of domestic goals being exported outside the 
boundaries of Iran.  
This chapter will proceed by examining the Iranian nuclear program to determine its place 
in our framework of rationality in comparison to constitutionality. The Iranian nuclear program is 
a prominent example of an intersectional policy because although it is squarely situated within 
Iran, the nuclear program has been highly contentious within the international community since 
undeclared nuclear facilities were discovered in Iran in 2002. While the nuclear program is located 
domestically yet has international implications, proxy groups are physically located in other areas 
yet carry much of Iran’s domestic ideological ideas. So, I will then examine Iran’s involvement 
with proxy groups through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a means to export ideological 
beliefs, which intersects domestic policy goals with foreign policy.  
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 For both sections, I will provide background and context into how these policies have been 
developed and what the intent of each policy is. I will then provide analysis on the individual 
policies regarding the framework of this thesis by determining the rationality-constitutionality of 
both policies. I will then conclude this chapter by providing discussion into how intersectional 
policies as a whole fit into the context of our understanding of rationality and constitutionality of 
Iranian foreign policy. 
Section 4.1: Introduction to The Nuclear Program 
 The Iranian nuclear program relates to foreign policy in two primary ways: the reasoning 
behind why such a program is necessary and the concern the nuclear program brings global and 
regional powers. The original Iranian nuclear program was cut off in the immediate aftermath of 
the 1979 revolution, a consequence of the program’s heavy reliance on international cooperation 
with countries Iran had just cut ties with, such as the United States.98 In 1984, Khomeini expressed 
interest in renewing the Iranian nuclear program, and Iranian leaders began to focus their energy 
on revamping the nuclear program once they were freed from the time and cost restraints of the 
war with Iraq.99 During this time, US intelligence agencies suspected Iran of using its civilian 
nuclear program as a cover for clandestine weapons development, which lead the United States to 
pressure potential suppliers, particularly Russia, to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran.100 This 
forced the young program to take an independent approach with little to no help from the 
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international community, a step which is thought to have drastically slowed down their program. 
While the capabilities of the Iran nuclear program may be of concern to the international 
community, prompting agreements such as the JCPOA, it is estimated that what they have done in 
forty years is generally completed by other nuclear programs within the first ten years.  
Today, it can be difficult to ascertain why Iran wants a nuclear program, and this lack of 
understanding primarily stems from the idea that the costs of pursuing a nuclear program have far 
outweighed the benefits up until this point, or at least they have from a Western perspective.  
 One significant downfall of Iran’s pursuit of a competitive nuclear program is that it has 
been excessively costly. Disproportionate sanctions have resulted from Iran’s limited nuclear 
gains, which limit the conventional options Iran can take. Sanctions have also had a crippling 
impact on the Iranian economy, which has contributed to high levels of inflation, stagnation, and 
unemployment.101 However, these are complex economic issues and current problems would not 
be completely fixed in the event that nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. Although Iran’s 
economy would find some relief in the lifting of those sanctions, there are still plenty of non-
nuclear sanctions, which deal that would remain in place and continue to cripple the economy, 
especially those centered around Iran’s support for groups the United States has deemed terrorist 
organizations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.102 From an economic standpoint, 
the nuclear program has been detrimental to other sectors. This would lead to the assumption that 
the economic loss is not worth the cost; however, the nuclear program is actually worth the cost 
when looked at from security and ideological viewpoints.  
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From an ideological standpoint, the nuclear program is arguably something much larger 
than a simple nuclear program to Iran – it is a program which embodies Iran’s willingness to stand 
up to other powers. Former President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, framed the nuclear issue as a 
matter of national sovereignty and greatness, and that the resistance of international pressure to 
restrict the nuclear program has become a rallying point for the nation.103 As the nuclear program 
has become more and more linked to the ideas of national pride and independence, strides in the 
nuclear program become symbols of Iranian strength. Essentially, the nuclear program has become 
intertwined with Iranian ideology to the point that Iran would want to continue the program 
because losing it or having it be unsuccessful would be seen as not only a nuclear failure, but as 
an Iranian failure. 
 From the security standpoint. Iran argues that its nuclear program is necessary for a balance 
of nuclear power in the region. Ali Larijani, the former chief negotiator of the nuclear program 
and the current speaker of the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, has argued that “Iran has a strategic 
perspective with respect to its nuclear program. When other nations of the region such as Egypt 
and Turkey have managed progress, there is no reason why Iran shouldn’t also be able to do so.”104 
Thus, Iran harbors the idea that their nuclear program is unjustly regulated in comparison to other 
actors in the Middle East.   
While Larijani has mentioned Egypt and Turkey, two nations with nuclear programs but 
no nuclear weapons, it is also significant to mention that nations in close proximity to Iran don’t 
just have nuclear programs but have nuclear weapon capabilities or have presumed nuclear weapon 
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capabilities: Israel, India, and Pakistan.105 Based on Iran’s wish to have nuclear programs which 
can compete with those of Egypt and Turkey, it can be reasonably inferred that they would want 
to further balance the nuclear power in the region by obtaining nuclear weapons so that Iran would 
be able to compete in the event of nuclear warfare. Although this is much more extreme than 
having a nonviolent nuclear program, it returns to the same concept prevalent in Larijani’s 
argument regarding Egypt and Turkey – that Iran does not want to be outmatched for regional 
power. 
Although Israel and the United States have attempted to portray the Islamic Republic of 
Iran as a nation that the basic logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to, Iran’s wish for the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons does not automatically indicate that Iran would use them as 
offensive weapons. Rather, any offensive use of nuclear weapons would invite massive retaliation 
and risk destroying Iran.106 It is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons by means of a 
national nuclear program, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its 
offensive capabilities which would lead to its own demise. Some observers and policymakers do 
hold dear to the idea that a nuclear weapon would embolden Iran, providing Tehran with a shield 
that would allow it to act more aggressively. This line of thinking directly contradicts the official 
stance of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who has publicly stated that, “We [Iran] have never 
sought nuclear weapons… With or without the nuclear deal, we will never seek nuclear 
weapons.”107 
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Even if Iran were to change its nuclear policy from a peaceful program to one which 
manufactures nuclear weapons, the idea that it would allow Iran to take more aggressive measures 
against its adversaries also contradicts the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back 
to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable 
and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of 
major powers.108 This awareness in turn discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive 
action, and there is little reason to believe that Iran would break this mold. 
In short, the Iranian nuclear program is necessary because it has become a larger symbol 
of Iranian ideals and because it is seen as a tool for deterrence. Although it may not be good 
economic policy, it is necessary for ideological and security reasons. While nuclear weapons can 
stand as a tool of deterrence, which would take care of Iran’s regional worries, nuclear weapons 
can also be seen as a critical need in any attempt to solidify Iran’s superiority in the region, or even 
the world. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said as much in November 2013 when he released 
a video to articulate Iran’s position on their nuclear program. In the video, Zarif spent less time 
talking about the fine details of nuclear policy and rather focused in on how Iran wished to continue 
their nuclear program because, “We [Iran] expect and demand respect for our dignity.”109 This is 
what makes the JCPOA such a standout policy on the part of Iran is that in relinquishing the 
smallest bit of control, they were given nuclear credibility on an international stage. To once again 
reference Zarif’s video which was released the same year the JCPOA was signed, he used rhetoric 
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which implied Iran was looking for “equal footing” and “mutual respect,” two attributes which 
Iran gained through international nuclear negotiations.110  
The second primary area to understand about the Iranian nuclear program is how it 
indirectly engages with global and regional powers. First, Iranian suspicion of the current 
international order relates to why a disarmament agreement would be unsuccessful – disarmament 
requires a state to relinquish some sovereignty in exchange for security. In terms of a weapons of 
mass destruction program, once a state renounces its program, it should have the assurance and 
support from the international community that it will be safe in the event that it is threatened by 
another state in possession of arms.111 Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran has formed this idea 
that the only way to truly safeguard their interests is to develop a nuclear deterrent. This makes 
engagement with other countries difficult in terms of nuclear agreements because both sides 
become distrustful of the other, and these agreements rely on trust.  
Section 4.2: The Significance of the JCPOA 
One of the most monumental examples of Iran’s nuclear related engagement with global 
powers is best witnessed through policies such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), informally known as the Iran nuclear deal. The JCPOA is an agreement between Iran 
and six world powers with the intent of curbing the lack of supervision over the Iran nuclear 
program in exchange for economic relief by the US, the European Union, and the United Nations 
Security Council, rolling back nuclear related economic sanctions.112 The JCPOA relied on the 
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify Iran’s compliance with the 
agreement, and subsequent inspections have verified that Iran has been in compliance with the 
nuclear deal.113 Although the deal is thought to have set Iran’s nuclear program back for anywhere 
from 5-10 years, President Trump withdrew the United States from the deal in October 2017.   
In January 2020 after the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, Iran declared that it 
would no longer abide by the JCPOA; however, Iran also announced that it would continue to 
coordinate with the IAEA, leaving open the idea of further compliance in the future. At the same 
time, the falling out of the JCPOA could lead to Iran to consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
to be a more significant objective on their political agenda.114 Iran’s departure from officially 
following the JCPOA was declared by Javad Zarif as the “final remedial step.”115 The ambiguity 
of this statement leaves room for Iran to further develop its enrichment capabilities without 
completely closing the door on future negotiations.  
Section 4.3: Analysis of Iran’s Nuclear Policy 
 In order to determine the rationality and constitutionality of Iran’s nuclear policy, we must 
keep in mind both the reason behind the nuclear program and the way in which the program 
engages international actors. Iran’s program doubles as a way in which Iran can preserve national 
identity and gain international recognition, while also serving as a potential tool of deterrence. 
Starting with constitutionality, these inferences which we have made about the nuclear program 
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further imply that the nuclear program serves as a way in which Iran can reject forms of dominance, 
preserve its independence, and preserve its territorial integrity from any potential aggressors.   
 The idea of defending the rights of all Muslims is not necessarily applicable in this policy 
area because there is no evidence that Muslims suffer disproportionately from nuclear based 
violence. Just as vague, there is no proof that any non-belligerence state has turned aggressive or 
hostile against Iran for the development of its nuclear program. Therefore, these two criteria are 
not applicable to our understanding of the constitutionality of Iran’s nuclear program. 
 In terms of non-alignment with hegemonic superpowers, I would argue that the best case 
against Iran doing this would be its coming to the nuclear deal agreement with the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, and Germany. However, only the United States is a 
hegemonic superpower out of these six nations, the two did not necessarily have to directly work 
together once the framework for the agreement was set, and neither nation currently complies with 
the agreement. So, Iran has not aligned with hegemonic superpowers by way of its nuclear 
program. So, it can be reasonably concluded that the Iranian nuclear program would be considered 
a constitutional foreign policy. 
 In terms of rationality, the determination is less cut and dry because of the reliance on both 
the preservation of ideological identity and the potential deterrence capabilities which stem from 
the nuclear program. However, I have determined that the deterrence capabilities are much more 
fundamental and necessary to the Iranian nuclear program, whereas ideological identity is not 
preserved through having a nuclear program but by the strength of that program. As deterrence 
relies on the existence of the program, I would argue that it takes precedence over national identity. 
If anything, the strength of national identity regarding the nuclear program innately relies on 
deterrence capabilities. So, if Iran is developing its nuclear program with deterrence of other 
 59 
nuclear powers in mind rather than only following the reason more strongly rooted in ideology, 
then the case for rationality is stronger than the case for irrationality. With that, the Iranian nuclear 
program can be concluded to be rational-constitutional.  
Section 4.4: Introduction to Proxy Groups 
 As I have already discussed Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq in Chapter Two: Regional 
Interactions, I will now focus on Iran’s development of proxy groups most closely related to that 
case, for the sake of simplicity and continuity. By examining Iran’s development of proxy groups 
in the region by way of the Quds Force, I hope to establish the role that these groups play in 
allowing ideological interests to be spread without having direct ties to the Iranian government.  
 Iranian proxies collectively represent a new power dynamic within the region, relying on 
the capitalization of regional unrest and insecurity. Advances through the use of proxies in places 
such as Iraq and Syria are largely examples of success for Iran. However, when examining Iranian 
proxy forces, it is important to keep in mind that some organizations are more “proxy” than others. 
To put it more plainly, the extent which certain proxies go to advance Iran’s ambitions depend 
largely on how developed the relationship is between the group and its primary benefactor.116 In 
order to fully comprehend the issue of Iranian proxy forces, it is essential to turn to the core group 
which the Islamic republic regularly relies on to do its bidding: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC). 
 The debate over the role of the IRGC within the Islamic Republic can be traced back to its 
legal roots through the Constitution. On December 04, 1979, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini formally created the IRGC by decree, although it had existed in some form for several 
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months before.117 The statute of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provided the earliest legal 
framework for the organization’s operations.  
The Islamic Republic had ratified its first constitution the day before, on December 3, 1979. 
Article 150 declared, 
“The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps … is to be maintained so that it may continue in its 
role of guarding the revolution and its achievements. The scope of the duties of this corps 
and its areas of responsibility, in relation to the duties and areas of responsibility of the 
other armed forces, are to be determined by law with emphasis on brotherly cooperation 
and harmony among them.”118 
 
A strict reading of Article 150 shows that the Guards' intervention in politics is not 
constitutionally mandated, yet at the same time such behavior is not legally prohibited. Nowhere 
does the constitution define the "enemies" against which the IRGC is obliged to guard the 
revolution, and this ambiguity allows for the group to be utilized both internally and externally as 
protection for the regime. It is even unclear whether the IRGC's primary role will be defense 
against external threats, in which case it should act as an army, or internal threats, in which it might 
act as a police force. 
Again, the Guards provided their own guidance on these issues. On March 19, 1980, 
"Obligations of the Guards" appeared in Payam-e Enghelab.119 In this IRGC monthly publication, 
the IRGC stated that 
“Cooperation with the government in military and security matters, including pursuit and 
arrest of armed counterrevolutionary movements.… Disarming unauthorized persons.… 
Investigation and intelligence gathering.… preservation of the public order at 
demonstrations and gatherings in order to prevent disruption of law and order… and 
support for freedom and justice-seeking movements of oppressed people under the 
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supervision of the Council of the Revolution, and with authorization from the 
government.”120 
 
Section 4.5: The Quds Force in Action 
Internal IRGC operations can still serve as a model for what many paramilitary groups can 
do to increase their political prominence within a given nation: run for office. The 2008 
parliamentary elections solidified the IRGC's political infiltration and demonstrated that the 
supreme leader supports the IRGC's growing role.121 While the role of the IRGC on the basis of 
the Constitution is largely internal with a disputed political role, the IRGC has branches which 
serve specialized roles outside of Iran such as the Quds Force, a unit in Iran’s IRGC which 
specializes in unconventional warfare and military intelligence operations. Although the exact size 
of the organization is not known, the Quds Force is closely linked to Iranian proxy groups as this 
unit operates across the Middle East.122  
Many in the United States and in other governments, particularly in the intelligence 
community, are keen to identify a clear operational relationship between the Iranian regime and 
its regional allies. This, however, misses the point of the Iranian model: proxies serve their own 
interests as well as some of Iran’s more ideological interests.123 Very rarely is Iran found guilty of 
giving direct instructions to their proxies, rather Iran uses the Quds Force to train and develop 
proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).124 One of 
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the oldest proxy groups is Hezbollah, which was first created when Iran aided the Shia population 
of Lebanon after the country had been invaded by Israel. Following this model, Iran is able to 
create a presence of proxy groups when they identify vulnerable populations that need to be 
protected by an aggressor, often with the aggressor being an adversary of Iran.125 
This same pattern can be found when the 2003 Iraq War provided fertile ground for the 
growth of Iranian proxies and supported groups. The Quds Force was once described as a “unit 
deployed to challenge the United States presence” in Iraq by arming and aiding Shiite militias. 
Iran likely has invested in these groups in part out of true concern over instability and 
fragmentation in both countries, which do not serve its regional interests.126 Tehran wants a 
moldable government but a functioning state in Iraq. This interest has been primarily served by 
way of the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella group for many Iranian backed militias. In 
the most recent Iraqi parliamentary elections, the PMF was able to win forty-eight seats, making 
one of the most powerful blocs in Parliament one which has close ties to Iran.127 
Section 4.6: Analysis of Iran’s Proxy Group Policy 
 Iran’s use of proxies as a way to create a pathway for plausible deniability for Iran while 
still exporting ideology creates a complex situation for our understanding of rationality. First, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif denies that Iran has proxies, replying to a 
President Trump tweet about “Iran or its proxies” with “Iran has FRIENDS: No one can have 
MILLIONS of ‘proxies.’”128 By this purposeful distancing between Iran and its “friends”, these 
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groups serve as a backdoor for Iran to pursue its more extreme, ideological-centered policies 
without being held responsible for them. So, we cannot confuse an ingenious policy for what we 
have defined as rational within this thesis.  
Despite the cleverness of Iran’s use of proxy groups, I argue that the use of proxy groups 
to largely export Iran’s policies that they do not want directly linked to themselves insinuates that 
any Iranian foreign policies pursued by way of proxy groups are actually quite irrational. They 
largely rely on ideological beliefs and prey on sectarian divides, and the overreliance on ideology 
as a primary driver of Iran’s policy on proxies makes this policy irrational.  
As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was created by the Constitution and they play 
a large role in the development of Iran’s proxy groups, Iran’s usage of proxy groups would be 
constitutional. However, this preliminary determination must still be put against the framework of 
this thesis to determine if the policy is constitutional based on the six criteria identified in the 
foreign policy section of the Constitution.  
First, Iran’s usage of proxy groups allows for Iran to expand its dominance without 
compromising its independence or territorial integrity. By creating a system of plausible 
deniability, any action these groups take which Iran does not want to be identified with can be 
easily denied, which allows for Iran to take the actions of each group into careful consideration. 
This means that any nation which Iran angers by way of its proxy groups cannot directly link Iran 
to any such action, thereby allowing Iran to pursue more irrational policies without compromising 
constitutionality.  
In terms of how Iran’s policy for proxy groups interacts with hegemonic superpowers and 
non-belligerent states, these two criteria are largely not applicable in this case. First, proxy groups 
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have a sense of security in their relationship with Iran, but other than that, they largely work as 
independent, non-state actors. So, Iran would be detached from any interaction these groups would 
have with a hegemonic superpower, and such interactions would be highly unlikely as the United 
States denotes many of these proxy groups as terrorist organizations. In terms of non-belligerent 
states, proxy groups are primarily located in conflict zones so it is highly unlikely that a peaceful 
state would be threatened by these groups as they would not come into direct contact with one 
another.  
Finally, defending the rights of all Muslims does occur through Iran’s use of proxy groups 
in the sense that Muslim’s are defended in a way which Iran best sees fit. For instance, in Iraq 
where proxy groups are used to fight against other Muslim groups, it could be argued that Iran’s 
policy of proxies might harm Muslims. But this argument may not hold up as our understanding 
of “defending the rights of all Muslims” once again leaves ambiguous as to who Muslims must be 
protected from. If a group of Muslims is threatening the rights of other Muslims, then conflict 
between the two would theoretically be allowed by the Iranian constitution; however, that will 
largely be based on our understanding of the situation at hand. So, because this final criterion is 
much more flexible and difficult to generalize, I will not use it in determining the constitutionality 
of Iran’s policy of proxies. Therefore, Iran’s policy of supporting proxy groups is irrational-
constitutional. 
Section 4.7: Discussion on Iran’s Intersectional Foreign Policies 
 I have now determined that Iran’s nuclear policy is rational-constitutional and Iran’s proxy 
policy is irrational-constitutional. Despite there not being an overall consensus as to how Iran 
approaches its intersectional policies, there are still a few key ideas which I believe can be taken 
away from our understanding of how Iran implements these policies.  
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 First, our understanding of both of these policies largely hinges on the idea that Iran utilizes 
these policies as a way to protect and pursue Iran’s more ideological foreign policy goals. In terms 
of the nuclear program, the nuclear program has been a way for Iran to gain international credibility 
and preserve national identity. For Iran’s usage of proxy groups, the exportation of ideology is 
much more directly linked to Iran’s constitutional goals; however, both closely relate to ideology. 
As the Constitution is an ideological document in itself, it is not surprising that both policies are 
constitutional due to them both being rooted in domestic ambitions.  
 Although the two policies differ in rationality, I propose a simple explanation for why that 
might be. Iran’s nuclear policy was the intersectional policy which I determined to be rational, and 
it is the policy which Iran publicly promotes. Although the nuclear program is tied to national 
identity, there are other purposes the nuclear program can serve for the security of Iran. On the 
other hand, Iran’s usage of proxy groups engages much more with history, culture, and ideology. 
It would be nearly impossible for such groups to operate independently of such factors, and Iran 
is able to deny direct involvement which allows them to pursue a more emboldened irrational 
proxy policy. Therefore, however publicly tied Iran is to the policy determines how rational the 
policy is, in the case of these two examples.  
 Finally, both the nuclear program and the use of proxy groups are unconventional tactics 
which Iran largely relies on in order to operate below the threshold of more conventional warfare 
tactics. Essentially, these two policies are used to help shape regional situations to Iran’s, whether 
they are rational foreign policies or not. So, Iran is aware of its military shortcomings, exacerbated 
by a failing economy, and in this awareness, Iran has discovered ways in which it is able to pursue 
its regional interests. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Section 5.1: Analysis of Constitutionality-Rationality for Iran’s Foreign Policy 
The three categories of Iranian foreign policy covered in this thesis are regional policies, 
global policies, and intersectional policies. In chapter two, I analyzed Iran’s regional policy in the 
context of its interactions with Israel and Iraq in which I determined both of these policies to be 
rational-constitutional. Chapter three contained an exploration of Iran’s interactions with two 
global superpowers: United States of America and China. Within these interactions, we observed 
two global powers whose primary interactions take place with Iran in the Middle East, a 
determination which implies that Iran’s primary interests are regional, not global. These two cases 
were determined to be irrational-constitutional and rational-unconstitutional, respectively. In 
chapter four, our two intersectional policies were Iran’s development of a nuclear program and 
development of regional proxy groups through the IRGC. While policies regarding the nuclear 
program were determined to be rational-constitutional, the use of proxy groups as a way to further 
ideological goals were determined to be irrational-constitutional.  
Now that these three areas of foreign policy have been explored through individual 
policies, we can take a macro-level view of Iranian foreign policy to determine the relationship 
between rationality and constitutionality in their foreign policy. The Islamic Republic of Iran was 
founded through revolution, with the goals of this revolution solidified in their Constitution. 
However, having an ideologically rooted Constitution evidently does not give Iran free reign to do 
as they please. Rather, Iran must balance its revolutionary, ideological goals with the practical 
demands of any nation-state.  
 We have three cases which have been determined to be rational-constitutional, a feat which 
showcases that a revolutionary, ideological foreign policy doctrine can intersect with a practical 
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foreign policy. These three cases are those of Iraq, Israel, and the nuclear program. For the most 
part, these are the three cases primarily defined by Iran’s regional ambitions and policies. Although 
the nuclear program is an intersectional policy rather than regional, the idea which permeates 
throughout the nuclear program is that it is needed to bring a balance of power to the region. These 
three cases are arguably the bread and butter of Iranian foreign policy, where Iran has enough 
historical reasoning to have policies which will be sustained and not dimmed with time. However, 
they all also have separate reasons for rationality, which arguably makes the general idea of their 
foreign policy even more rational in that they tailor their policy to who they are dealing with, rather 
than having one broad policy for all of their regional ambitions.   
 For irrational-constitutional, there are two cases which stand out: global interactions with 
the United States and the development of proxy groups through the IRGC. Iran’s use of proxy 
groups in an inventive, clever policy which is rooted in ideological beliefs. In the case of the United 
States, both the United States and Iran act rather irrationally towards the other based on perceived 
ideological differences and historical distrust. It should be noted that neither policy is invalid nor 
lacks credibility simply because it is irrational. These determinations were simply made because 
historical, ideological, or cultural reasons outweighed any other reason Iran may have for pursuing 
that specific policy.  
 Our final case, China, is the only case which qualified as rational-unconstitutional within 
the framework of this thesis. This policy shows that although Iran wishes to pursue its ideological 
goals, it is not blind to the economic constraints it faces in doing so. Quite simply, a rational-
unconstitutional policy is a simple payoff for Iran to pursue its irrational-constitutional policies. 
Iran’s China policy is an economic counterweight to US sanctions, making part of Iran’s foreign 
policy a balancing act.  
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 Finally, we had no cases which were found to be irrational-unconstitutional. Although the 
argument could be made that this paper only included six cases and criteria which would not allow 
for there to be an example of an irrational-unconstitutional policy, I would argue that it would be 
nearly impossible to find an irrational-unconstitutional policy. For one, rationality and 
constitutionality are complementary to one another. Rationality rests on the idea that foreign policy 
decisions must not be made primarily on ideological, historical, or cultural claims. However, 
rationality is not exclusive of these. In cases where rationality and constitutionality do exclude the 
other, then the characteristic which has not been excluded is the primary reason behind the 
decision. Constitutionality in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth a policy that is 
rooted in ideological and historical reasoning. For a foreign policy to be irrational but also 
unconstitutional, the country would have to be in the midst of a major ideological shift in which 
the goals of the Constitution are no longer applicable. So, it would not be impossible for foreign 
policy to be exclusive of both rationality and constitutionality, but there are currently be no feasible 
irrational-unconstitutional cases for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy. 
 Overall, there is one clear fact about Iran’s foreign policy which goes directly against 
preconceived notions held about Iranian foreign policy: it is extremely nuanced. Here are six cases, 
a comprehensive, though not conclusive, representation of Iran’s foreign policy, and there were 
three cases deemed rational-constitutional, two deemed irrational-constitutional, and one deemed 
rational-unconstitutional. Every case posed a different set of circumstances in which those 
determinations were made, and I cannot determine one label to fit the entirety of Iran’s foreign 
policy because it truly just depends on the case at hand.  
Therefore, Iran is not just a member of the “axis of evil” or a nation which will be the cause 
of war. Rather, Iran is a country who does what it believes is in its best interest for the case at hand. 
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There is no one simple characterization of Iranian foreign policy, and if there were, it would not 
be irrational as the majority of its policies are quite rational.  
Section 5.2: Limits of this Research 
Although I am confident regarding the findings of this thesis, that is not to say that there 
were no limits to this research. The first issue which I will address is the amount of case studies I 
used, then I will address the data which was collected on those cases.  
 As I had time constraints, I had to balance the quantity and quality of research I was able 
to do. In order to dutifully ensure that the cases which I selected were done justice, I restricted 
myself to two cases per division of foreign policy. These cases were strategically selected as they 
brought to light different aspects of Iran’s regional, global, and intersectional policies. At the same 
time, Iraq and Israel do not represent the entirety of the Middle East nor do China and the United 
States represent the entirety of the globe. Rather, these were the most prominent cases which I 
believed to be most relevant to this research because of the fine balance Iran must strike between 
constitutionality and rationality in each. Foreign policy is nuanced and is tailored for the country 
on the receiving end of the policy. If any category of foreign policy were to be researched 
individually, then a more complete picture could be drawn regarding Iran’s regional, global, and 
intersectional policies, including any outliers that I did not have the ability to capture with this 
thesis. This could include, but is not limited to, nations which are considered non-belligerent states 
by Iran, non-state actors, or allies and adversaries in different regions.  
 A second limitation to this research was the ability to ensure that sources used were as 
unbiased as possible. As I worked primarily with government statements and documents, it is 
difficult to know the accuracy of those documents. This is especially true for statements made in 
Farsi or Arabic, as I relied on translations of those documents into English. Apart from translation 
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issues, I worked with open-source data as opposed to data which could contradict what is publicly 
pushed by the governments of each country discussed in this thesis. 
Section 5.3: Looking Forward 
As far as future opportunities for this research go, this thesis was not intended to offer any 
policy recommendations, but rather serve as an analytical product to understanding Iran’s approach 
to foreign policy. This new understanding relies on the framework introduced by this thesis, with 
rationality and constitutionality serving as the designations for Iran’s foreign policy doctrines. So, 
there is opportunity for research to be expanded through the application of this new framework to 
other areas of Iranian foreign policy. 
Outside of the practical application of this framework for future research, this thesis also 
presents an opportunity for there to be a shift in the way the United States views, discusses, and 
interacts with Iran. Referring back to statements from President Bush, President Obama, and 
President Trump, the United States has pushed a message for nearly two decades that because Iran 
clashes with the United States, Iran poses a threat to global stability. Rather, this thesis has 
determined that Iran does not pose a threat to global stability but rather offers a challenge to US 
interests in the Middle East.  
After the United States imposed sanctions on him in 2019, the Foreign Affairs Minister of 
Iran Javad Zarif tweeted, “Thank you for considering me such a huge threat to your agenda.”129 
The spirit of this tweet translates well for Iranian foreign policy – as a sovereign nation, what is in 
Iran’s best interest does not have to coincide with what is in the United States’ best interest. And 
having competing interests has led the United States to characterize Iran as a much larger threat 
than Iran actually is.  
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